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Abstract: 
 This dissertation was written as a part of the post-graduated program of LLM 
IN Transnational and European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy 
Law in academic year 2014-2015. 
 In the first segment of this thesis is tried a general analysis of the article 102 of 
TFEU and a short reference of the relative case law, while in the second part is 
annotated the joined cases C-241/1991 P. and C-242/1991 P. of ECJ - “Magill case” - 
by the view of competition policy. 
 Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor teacher, Mr. Professor 
Pavlos Masouros, because his lecture of EU Competition Law / Antitrust Law, 
constituted the reason for the selection of the object of this dissertation. 
 
        Panagiotis Stamatis, 
         20-02-2016 
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Preface: 
 The significance of the EU competition law is obvious is our daily life, as does 
not concern only the participants-undertakings in trade, but and the consumers. 
 However, its implementation may cause problems when is contrary to others 
legal rights. One of these considerations concerns the question when and under 
circumstances a “refusal to license” can be considered as “abusive behavior”, in 
accordance with the article 102 of the TFEU. 
 The decision of ECJ in “Magill case” constitutes important innovation to the 
development of the consideration for the EU jurisprudence, as concerns this issue. 
This dissertation concerns the annotation of this decision by the view of competition 
policy. During the examination of this case, becomes obvious that the IP rights and 
EU competition law are not in conflict, as have the same aim, which is the protection 
of consumers’ welfare, however, each of them tries to achieve this in a different way.  
 
        Panagiotis Stamatis 
         20-02-2016 
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I.Introduction 
 The issue of the abusive dominant position by undertakings constitutes only a 
part of the more general problematic of free and fair competition in the market of the 
European Union (EU). The free and fair competition constitutes, except for 
fundamental principle of EU legislation, basic political aim of EU, and for this reason 
is linked unbreakably with the whole ratio of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). 
 The legislation that regulates the free and fair competition can be categorized 
to national law of every Member State, such as the Greek law 703/1977, which 
concerns the control of monopolies and oligopolies, and the law of EU. Furthermore, 
the EU law can be divided in Treaty law and secondary law, which specializes the 
first one, like the Regulation 193/2004 of European Council (EC) that concerns the 
control of concentrations between undertakings *1. 
 The special topic of the abuse of dominant position is faced in the article 102 
of TFEU and the relative issue of the prohibition of cartels - antitrust law – is 
regulated by the article 101 of TFEU. 
 The object of this thesis is the annotation of the joined cases C-241,242/1991 
P., Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
Commission of the European Communities, of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) - 
Judgement of the Court of 6 April 1995 - by the view of competition policy. The 
ruling which was created by this case contributed definitely to the promotion of 
consideration about the issue of the abusive dominant position.  
 Although the article 102 of TFEU constitutes law of Treaty, regulates directly 
and sufficiently this issue. However, the general formation of this article demands its 
in concreto specialization. This target is achieved by the examination of EU case law, 
which typically cannot be considered as law stricto sensu, but in practice its 
significance is undoubted. Therefore, it is necessary, before the comment of this case, 
to try a brief theoretical analysis of the article 102 of TFEU. It is purposed the 
reference of prerequisites of implementation or non-implementation of this article to 
be confirmed by the relative EU case law. 
 At the end of this introduction, it would be omission not to mention the 
important role of the European Commission due to the decisive competence that has 
in accordance with the EU legal framework. Nevertheless, the power of Commission 
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is regulated by procedural provisions - Regulation 1/2003 of EC -, whose examination 
exceeds the scope of this thesis *2. 
 
REFERENCES: 
*1: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ 
ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 582-584. 
*2: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 444-448. 
 
 
II.Main Part 
A. Analysis of the article 102 of TFEU: relative case law 
1. Prerequisites of implementation 
 In accordance with the paragraph 1 of the article 102 of TFEU: “any abuse by 
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States”. So, in order to be implemented 
this article is demanded to be fulfilled four criteria. The first is the existence of 
dominant position by one or more undertakings in the EU market or in a substantial 
part of it, the second is the undertaking or undertakings to exploit its or their 
dominance in an abusive way, the third is the existence of causal connection among 
the dominant position and the abusive conduct and the fourth is the potential effect of 
trade between Member States *3,4. As concerns the third criterion, the causal link is 
not demanded to be very strict, as it is not necessary the dominant position to be the 
mean in order to be achieved the target, which is the abuse of dominant position. So, 
the abusive practice of an undertaking violates the article 102 regardless of the fact if 
this abuse is caused exclusively to its dominant position. This opinion expressed in 
paragraph 27 of the decision of case C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and 
Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities. 
Furthermore, it is important to make clear that it is possible, in order to be effective 
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the article 102, the dominant position to exist in other market than that in which the 
abuse takes place *5. This opinion, which does not doubt the necessity of the existence 
of the causal link of the third criterion, was supported in case C-333/1994, Tetra Pak 
International SA v Commission of the European Communities, constituting innovation 
for the analysis of the article 102 of TFEU *6. In accordance with the paragraph 31 of 
this decision: “accordingly, the Court of First Instance was right to accept the 
application of the article 86 of the Treaty in this case, given that the quasi-monopoly 
enjoyed by Tetra Pak on the aseptic markets and its leading position on the distinct, 
though closely associated, non-aseptic markets placed it in a situation comparable to 
that of holding a dominant position on the markets in question as a whole.” More 
special, in this decision the ECJ considered that there were distinct, but connected 
markets, and the existence of dominant position within one of them, actually does the 
undertaking indirectly dominant in each of these markets. So, the special 
circumstances substitute the lack of causal link stricto sensu *7.  
The second paragraph of the article 102 of TFEU is referred to some cases that 
may be considered as “abusive practices”. At this point it is crucial to remark that the 
enumeration in this paragraph is indicative, as is used the phrase “in particular”, not 
restrictive *8,9. This enumeration has been derived, actually, from the European case 
law, whose diachronic examination shows that these behaviors are used to be abusive. 
In other words, we can say that if the conduct of an undertaking can be subjected to in 
one of these cases, this conduct is presumed as “abusive” arguably. In order to be 
inverted this rebuttable evidence, the undertaking has to prove that its conduct can be 
justified objectively - principle of essentiality - *10. So, the fact that an undertaking , 
for example, applies dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, can be considered 
initially as “abusive” practice, but in order to be judged finally as “abusive”, it is 
necessary to be examined in concreto if this conduct can be justified objectively. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the legal exception of the paragraph 3 of the article 101 of 
TFEU is not effective as concerns the article 102. This is the opinion of the 
jurisprudence in the case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing v Commission of the European 
Communities *11. The opposite opinion argues that due to the fact that the articles 101 
and 102 have common aim, as both articles protect the free and fair competition, it is 
rational to consider that the exceptions of their implementation must be derived from 
the same legal basis - noninterpretivism and teleological interpretation - . However, 
this viewpoint is not acceptable, because violates the literal construction, as the article 
102 does not contain such an exception. Moreover, this opinion cannot be supported 
neither in the frame of the purposive construction, as the dominant position creates an 
increased number of conditions of danger in comparison with the illegal agreements 
of the article 101. Therefore, the scope of exceptions of the article 102 must be 
stricter. 
 
REFERENCES: 
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2. The meaning of the “dominant position”: necessary condition the 
definition of the meaning of the “relevant market” 
 The definition of the meaning of the “dominant position” requires necessarily 
priory the determination of the “relevant market”, in which the undertaking possesses 
and exploits its economic strength - abuse of dominant position in relevant market - 
*12,13 . So, the court must previously examine which is the meaning of the “relevant 
market” and in which manner this is defined.  
 The “relevant market” is defined by the market of products or services, 
geographical market and temporal market. The European Commission published the 
Notice 97/C-372/03 on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law. By this Notice, the Commission adopts the principle of 
“small but significant and non transitory increase in prices (SSNIP)” *14. 
 The relevant jurisprudence in order to fix the market of products or services 
uses the criterion of interchangeability - case C-27/76, United Brands Company and 
United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities -.  In 
accordance with this criterion as bigger is the possibility of substitute products as 
bigger is the relevant market and the reversely *15,16,17,18,19,20. Nevertheless, this 
criterion does not operate taking into consideration only the objective features of the 
products, but the conditions of competition and the structure of supply and demand, 
which are judged in concreto *21.  
 The relevant geographical market is localized in the EU, in which the 
companies compete under the same or sufficiently homogeneous conditions - case T-
229/94, Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission of the European Communities - *22. As 
“relevant geographical” market can be considered either the whole EU or substantial 
part of it or this market can be constituted only to the territory of one Member State of 
EU, as it is considered that this territory is a substantial part of whole internal market 
and that the abuse of dominant position in this territory may affect the trade between 
Member States - case C-322/81, NV Nederlandesche Banden Industrie Michelin n 
Commission of the European Communities - *23. 
 The existence of dominant position is considered in relation with a particular 
time period, as the conditions of competition and economic power change rapidly. So, 
it is possible an undertaking which possesses dominant position after the passing of 
period not have such a position, as the circumstances may be different *24. 
 
REFERENCES: 
*12: http: // ec.europa.eu / competition/ publications, Competition: Antitrust 
procedures in abuse of dominance, Article 102 TFEU cases, © European Union, 
2013. 
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*21: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 409-412. 
*22: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 412-413. 
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*23: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 422-424. 
*24: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 413-414.ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ 
ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ 
ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ- 
 
3. The meaning of “dominant position” 
 The definition of the meaning of “dominant position” is very complex, as it is 
not a pure legal issue, but and economic *25. The consideration of the existence of 
“dominance” requires the whole assessment of the special conditions of 
every case *26. At this point it is significant to refer how two decisions of ECJ, 
which constitute boundary mark for the analysis of article 102, faced this issue.  
The first decision concerns the case C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and 
Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities. At this 
decision the court approach the meaning of “dominant position” based on an 
economic criterion. In accordance with this decision, an undertaking is dominant 
when its conduct is independent in such an extent that permits it not be affected 
substantially by its competitors, suppliers and purchasers *27,28. 
The second decision concerns the case C-27/76, United Brands Company and 
United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. At this 
decision, the ECJ tried to approach the issue of dominance more legally. In special the 
paragraph 65 of this decision refers that: “the dominant position referred to in this 
article - article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty) - 
relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it 
to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers” *29,30. 
 
REFERENCES: 
*25:  ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
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ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 402-403. 
*26: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 409-412. 
*27:  Professor Rudolf Geiger, Professor Daniel-Erasmus Khan and Professor Markus 
Kotzur, European Union Treaties, Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, C.H. BECK ∙ Hart 2015, pages 502-503. 
*28:  ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 404-406. 
*29:  Professor Rudolf Geiger, Professor Daniel-Erasmus Khan and Professor Markus 
Kotzur, European Union Treaties, Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, C.H. BECK ∙ Hart 2015, pages 502-503. 
*30: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 404-406. 
 
 
 
4. The meaning of “abuse” 
 The definition of the meaning of “abuse” is crucial, as the existence of a 
dominant position only is not unlawful. In the contrary, the dominance constitutes the 
target of every undertaking, which exploiting its economic strength, in conditions of 
monopoly or oligopoly, tries to gain the biggest possible profit *31. 
 The abusive practices harm does not harm only the competitors of the 
company that is dominant, but every market participant, like the consumers, the 
purchasers and the suppliers. Therefore, the violation of the article 102 puts in danger 
the whole structure of open and fair competition. Due to this fact, the scope of the 
article 102 is extensive, protecting in paragraph 1 mainly the whole structure of free 
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and fair competition - article 3g of EEC Treaty -, and indirectly the consumers and 
customers, and in paragraph 2 mainly the consumers, purchasers and suppliers, as 
these categories are harmed directly by the abusive practices of paragraph 2 *32,33. 
 More special, an abusive practice may be constituted to one of the indicatively 
referred cases of the paragraph 2 of article 102 or may not. In every case, in order to 
be implemented the article 102, it is necessary to be fulfilled cumulatively the 
prerequisites of the paragraph 1.  
The definition of “abuse” is given in paragraph 91 of the decision of case C-
85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities. 
In accordance with it: “the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the 
behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in 
question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to 
methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or 
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or 
the growth of that competition”. So, becomes obvious that the ‘abuse” is judged 
objectively, not subjectively *34. Therefore, the sole criterion is if the behavior of the 
dominant company has restrictive result, which harms the free and fair competition 
*35. The existence, kind and degree of fault are taken into consideration by the court 
in order to impose the level of the fine against the violators. 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
*31: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 402, 421-422. 
*32: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 418-420. 
*33: Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies & Giorgio Monti, European Union Law, 
CASES ANS MATERIALS, SECOND EDITION, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2010, pages1001-1003. 
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*34: Professor Rudolf Geiger, Professor Daniel-Erasmus Khan and Professor Markus 
Kotzur, European Union Treaties, Treaty on European Union, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, C.H. BECK ∙ Hart 2015, page 504. 
*35: ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 418-419. 
 
5. The potential effect of trade between Member States 
 In order to apply the article 102 of TFEU, it is sufficient the existence of 
probability of effect, as concerns the operation of commerce, between Member States. 
So, it is not required the abuse of dominant position to have as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the market of EU, as 
required for the implementation of the article 101, as regards the anti-competitive 
agreements and practices *36,37. We can say generally that this criterion is fulfilled 
when the company’s behavior may have impact on the whole structure of competition 
in EU market *38. In practice, whether the rest prerequisites of the article 102 exist, 
the condition of potential effect is considered that is fulfilled. 
 
REFERENCES: 
*36: JOHN FAIRHURST, Law of European Union, Ninth Edition, PEARSON 2012, 
pages 720-721. 
*37:  ΛΑΜΠΡΟΣ Ε. ΚΟΤΣΙΡΗΣ, ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΟ ΕΜΠΟΡΙΚΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ, ΕΙΣΑΓΩΦΗ 
ΣΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΊΚΗΣ ΕΝΩΣΗΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΝΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΜΟΥ – 
ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΗΣ ΙΔΙΟΚΤΗΣΙΑΣ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ 
ΕΤΑΙΡΙΩΝ – ΔΙΚΑΙΟ ΑΦΕΡΕΓΓΥΟΤΗΤΑΣ, Έκδοση 2η, ΕΚΔΟΣΕΙΣ 
ΣΑΚΚΟΥΛΑ ΑΘΗΝΑ-ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗ 2012, pages 422-424. 
*38: RICHARD WHISH and DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW, Seventh 
Edition, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2012, pages 178-179. 
 
B. Annotation of the joined cases C-241,242/91 (“Magill’ case) of ECJ 
  
1.Brief reference of real facts 
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 The appellants are the enterprises Radio Eireann (RTE) - public authority 
having its office in Dublin - and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) - 
company incorporated under English law –. Intervener in favor of them is the 
Intellectual Property Owners (IPO), having its registered office in Washington. 
Defendant is the Commission of the European Communities and intervener in favor of 
it is the Magill TV Guide Ltd, which has its registered office in Dublin.  
 The enterprises RTE, ITV and BBC issued television guides for their 
television programs. For the operation of this activity the ITV established the 
company ITP. That period, there was not any general weekly television guide, which 
contained all the TV programs of the week. This “market margin” tried to cover the 
Magill TV Guide Ltd. Nevertheless, in order to exercise this activity, it was necessary 
prerequisite the grant of license of publications from the RTE, IPO and BBC their TV 
programs that constituted the “necessary first material” for the creation of a general 
weekly TV guide. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) judged that the refusal of 
these companies to supply their guides violates the article 86 of EEC Treaty - article 
102 of TFEU - ratifying actually, as concerns the result, the decision of the Court of 
First Instance (CFI), while preceded the issue of interim measures by the President of 
the European Court of Justice that withheld the appellants’ obligation to grant the 
licensing, as was decided by the Commission. The procedure began from the 
application of the Magill TV Guide Ltd application before the Commission. This 
application was founded in two legal bases, the one is the implementation of the 
article 85 of EEC Treaty - article 101 of TFEU -, as the Magill claimed that the 
appellants’ concerned action constituted illegal agreement and the other is the article 
86 of ECC Treaty - article 102 of TFEU - with the argumentation that the appellants’ 
behavior, who possessed dominant position, is abusive. However, the Commission’s 
decision concerned only the violation of the article 86 of EEC Treaty - article 102 of 
TFEU - *39.  
 
REFERENCES: 
*39: STEVEN ANDERMAN and ARIEL EZRACHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND COMPETITION LAW New Frontiers, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2011, 
pages 144-145.  
 
 
 
 
2.General legal framework 
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 In these joined cases, it is not on purpose to try an extensive legal assessment, 
as concerns the issue of the existence of dominant position. The present annotation is 
focuses on the issue of the abuse of dominant position. So, the question that is 
demanded to answer is if the refusal of licensing that is described in this case, 
constitutes abusive practice. 
 Actually, the question begins from the conflict among the intellectual property 
rights, as concerns the obligation to license in special, and the protection of free and 
fair competition. In this issue the problematic concerns firstly, if the holder of an IP 
right, who possesses dominant position, is legalized to deny the assignment of its right 
to competitors, secondly to what extent and finally, under which circumstances. A 
first, but not complete, answer was given in case C-238/87, Volvo v Veng. In 
accordance with it, the dominant IP rightholders’ deny of licensing cannot be 
considered as “abusive”, apart from the case in which such refusal constitutes an 
“obvious arbitrary behavior”. So, the enforcement of an IP rightholder to license 
would annul the core of this right, even though this licensing would be granted in 
reasonable rate *40,41. Nevertheless, the case that constitutes the boundary mark for 
this issue is “Magill” case, as we will see in the next chapters. 
 The IP rights and the competition law have the same aim, which is to develop 
the consumers’ welfare, but each of them follows a different way in order to achieve 
that. We can say generally, that the IP rights’ protection is indirect and in a long term, 
as follows the logic of creation and protection of incentives - dynamic efficiency - in 
contrast to the legal framework of competition law that protects directly in a short-
term the consumers’ welfare, as aims to the consumers’ possibility to have many and 
high-quality goods or services in rational prices due to the existence of free 
competition - static or allocative efficiency - *42,43,44. However, this distinction is not 
absolute, as the dynamic efficiency may be served by the implementation of 
competition rules in contrast to IP rights, which when are used in order to restrict the 
open competition, the innovation target, as a result of dynamic efficiency, is not 
served and their exercise in such a manner may be considered as abusive - incentive 
balancing test - *45,46. For this reason, it is not certain that in abstracto the exercise of 
an IP right will supersede against to EU competition rules, as fundamental even if is.  
 If we consider that generally, the rules of competition law regulate the 
behavior of enterprises, except for the cases in which the basic IP rights are 
implemented, this will constitute a pure formalistic approach. This approach of the 
prevalence of the core IP rights, which is adopted in the United States, has the 
advantage that safeguards the legal certainty, however, ignores the special conditions 
of every situation that must be assessed in concreto. This gap is covered by an 
economic-approach analysis, which is adopted by the EU case law. In accordance 
with this approach, is tried an in concreto comprehensive balance *47. The economic-
approach analysis uses the criteria of specific subject-matter, essential function and 
anti-competitive intent of the holders’ of copyright *48. The use of these criteria 
becomes obvious examining the General Advocate’s opinion in “Magill case”. The 
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more characteristic expression of this analysis is the adoption of the “exceptional 
circumstances” theory, which is used initially in “Magill case” constituting important 
innovation for the facing of other cases that are subjected to the general category of 
practices of “refusal of licensing”. In accordance with this theory, the application of 
comprehensive balance may lead to the predominance of the provisions of 
competition law against to the IP rights’ protection, even though these rights are 
fundamental, if special conditions exist. 
The supporters of the prevalence of IP rights argue that the owners of the 
intellectual property rights are regulated in a dominant way by the national laws of the 
Member States. Furthermore, base this opinion on the article 36 of EC Treaty, as this 
article justifies the exercise of these rights against to the fundamental principle of free 
movement of goods. The opposite opinion, claims that the provisions of EU 
legislation, mainly the Treaty law, but and the derivative law of EU, prevail *49. 
 The truth is that the solution can be given only in the frame of in concreto 
comprehensive balancing of the contrary interests *50.  For this balancing crucial is 
the implementation of the principle of proportionality, in accordance with it, finally, 
surrenders the right, which is judged less significant, in favor of and at extent that is 
necessary, without to be harmed its core, in order to be safeguarded the most 
significant right *51,52. The effort of an a priory and in abstracto assessment and 
categorization of rights will lead to the acceptance of a similar theory of “preferred 
freedoms” that is effective in the constitutional law of USA.   
 In Magill case, as the Court of First Instance as the ECJ substantially adopted 
as the implementation of this comprehensive balancing, because the examination if 
the behavior of the RTE, IPO and BBC must be considered as abusive or is justified 
objectively requires such balancing and as the implementation of the principle of 
proportionality, as concerns the examination if the obligation to license harms 
disproportionally their copyright. In addition, the examination of the article 36 of EC 
Treaty and the Guidance “on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings”, seems the above described balancing test. 
REFERENCES: 
*40: STEVEN ANDERMAN and ARIEL EZRACHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
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3.The legal assessment of the joined cases C-241,242/91 of ECJ 
 First of all, it is without doubt that the copyright has double nature, as contains 
a right of property and a moral right. The exclusionary power of reproduction that is 
assigned freely by the owner of copyright constitutes rational substantial extension of 
this right. However, when the discussion comes before the ECJ or national court of 
every Member State, the dispute has to be settled in accordance with specific rules. 
One of these rules is the prevalence of EU legislation, mainly of Treaty law. 
Therefore, the crucial criterion of the resolution cannot be other than the examination 
initially, whether the behavior of the above enterprises can be subjected to in article 
102 of TFEU. 
 As concerns the issue of the existence of dominant position is not remarkable 
is these cases. For this reason the discussion about the definition of the relevant 
market, which methodologically precedes, is without sense. Besides, the 
determination of relevant market did not doubt by the applicants.  However, we can 
say that the decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) that there was dominant 
position and the further approval of ECJ of this opinion can be generally commented 
as correct, as the combination of the fact that the majority of households in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland take the TV magazines of RTE, IPO and BBC and the 
possibility of them not to assign their guides exercising their copyright prove the 
dominance of these companies. 
 As concerns the question of abuse, the behavior of the applicants cannot be 
subjected to in paragraph 2 of article 102 – legal criterion -, as a result making the 
discussion more complex. So, the examination is focused on the paragraph 1 of the 
same article. 
 First of all, it is obvious that the exercise of a copyright cannot constitute 
abuse of dominant position at first instance. The opposite opinion would be illogical, 
as a right derived from every national law of Member States and EU law would be 
judged, not finally and in concreto, but a priory as unlawful. Therefore, only under 
special circumstances that are assessed in concreto may this exercise considered as 
‘abusive” *53,54. In this case, the special conditions are the following. 
 Briefly, we can say that the CFI considered that the appellants’ refusal to 
license exceeded the scope of the essential function of copyright and cannot be 
justified objectively. Considering the CFI’s decision, as result, is correct, however, the 
justification is not sufficient, because considered the vague legal meaning of the 
“essential function”, whose specialization belongs to the national legislations of 
Member States, as the determining criterion of the question if there is abuse. We can 
say that the CFI and the Commission previously, tried to “correct” indirectly or, in 
better case to interpret authentically the IP national law, using the criterion of subject-
matter of an IP right, its essential function and the anti-competitive intent of the rivals 
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*55. In the contrary, the ECJ differentiated correctly from this approach basing its 
opinion on the comprehensive balance among the protection of holders of copyright 
and free competition, taking into consideration the existing special circumstances. 
Actually, the ECJ does not have the competence to consider if the enterprise’s 
behavior is covered by the subject-matter of copyright nor serves the essential 
function of this right, nonetheless, has the power to challenge this behavior whether is 
obviously contrary to the EU competition law. 
 Initially, the ECJ confirmed that in the market there was not the product that 
the Margin wanted to provide, as a full weekly TV guide, which contains all the 
programs of the week accompanied by comments and images. So, the consumers had 
a potential, permanent and special demand. 
 Secondly, the TV guides that possess the applicants constitute substantially, 
the “first material”. Therefore, the refusal of them to supply the Magill TV Guide Ltd, 
makes impossible the issue of the product that Magill wants to sell, safeguarding 
abusively with this manner their derivative market of programs. 
 The decision of ECJ in this case belongs to the wider family of decisions that 
concern the abusive practice of “refusal to license”, which can be conducted with 
many different ways, like the cases C-418/01, IMS Health v NDC or T-201/04, 
Microsoft v Commission. 
 In accordance with the paragraphs 75 until 88 of Guidance “on the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings”, the “refusal to supply”, in 
order to be considered as “abusive”, must concern a product that is necessary 
objectively for the exercise of the commercial activity that is impeded. Furthermore, 
this refusal must lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream 
market harming the consumers, as their potential demand is not satisfied *56. At this 
point, it is significant to note that crucial criterion is that the harm of consumers will 
be bigger than of the damage that will be suffered the enterprises if are obliged to 
supply their product or service. These directives seem to be fulfilled in “Magill” case.  
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4. The Opinion of the Advocate General Claus Gulmann 
It is crucial to examine the legal argumentation of the Advocate General in 
every case regardless of the fact that the court is not obliged to adopt it. In this case its 
opinion is determining, as it centers on all the legal aspects of the case, so its 
examination is necessary for the understanding of the Court’s decision. The 
Advocate’s opinion is differentiated in many points, mainly in comparison with CFI, 
but and with the decision of the ECJ that followed. We will try to note the most 
significant points which concern the relation between copyright and competition, in 
the contrary it will be avoided any reference to the issues of the examination of Berne 
Convention and procedural questions what can be subjected to in the object-matter of 
the appeal, as their examination exceeds the scope of this thesis. 
 In accordance with the paragraph 11 of the Opinion of the Advocate General 
the nature of copyright is unbreakably linked with the power of its holder to assign or 
not it, so a minimum legal restriction of competition is inevitable. The question is 
when this restriction is not justified having as a result the unlawful distortion of 
competition. Generally, is adopted the principle of “comprehensive balance” - 
“principle of practical harmonization” - this term is used to the Constitutional Science 
of Greece - *57, as concerns the conflict among copyright and free and fair 
competition and the principle of proportionality, as concerns the extent of the 
restriction against to copyright. These principles were analyzed in the Unit 2. In 
relation to “Magill” case, it is crucial to answer to the questions under which 
conditions the licensing is obligatory, which price is considered as “rational” and 
whether the obligatory licensing is indispensable for the safeguarding of competition 
 The article 30 of EC Treaty, actually, constitutes the legal basis for the 
protection of holders of copyright, because, if this article would not exist, the question 
was settled in favor of the approach that protects the competition, with the argument 
that the Law of Treaties - article 102 of TFEU, in special - supersedes to the national 
laws or to the secondary European Law, in the cases which copyright is protected in 
them. Also, the formation of this article implies the principle of comprehensive 
balance. 
 In accordance with the thought 38 of the General Advocate, the refusal of 
assignment of copyright, as it was referred above, does not constitute abusive 
practice, even though this copyright taking into consideration the existing 
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circumstances creates a rebuttable presumption of dominance. So, this obligation 
assignment leads to the annulment of the copyright’s basis. This view was supported 
in the case C-238/87, Volvo v Veng (UK) Ltd *58i. The question is whether and under 
which circumstances such a refusal can be may constitute abuse of dominant position. 
 It is interesting the thoughts 43 until 52 of Advocate. In these paragraphs is 
presented the Commission’s legal argument that the articles 30-36 of EC Treaty have 
a general scope and that concern only the Member States, not the citizens and legal 
entities, implying that these provisions do not have direct third-party applicability. In 
the contrary, such applicability has the article 102 (86 of EC Treaty) of TFEU for 
enterprises that possess dominant position. Furthermore, the Commission supports 
that the articles 30-36 of EC Treaty concern generally, all the companies not only that 
have dominant position. In relation with this viewpoint, first of all, we can say that 
Commission annuls its initial claim that the articles 30-36 do not have direct third-
party applicability, as supports simultaneously that these articles concern companies 
which are not dominant. Secondly, although the formation of article 30 leads to the 
interpretation that concerns generally the companies, it is fact that, in practice, an 
enterprise which possesses a copyright is probable to be dominant. This is known by 
the European legislator, as if such dominance does not exist, the distortion of trade 
between Member States is difficult to be happened. Moreover, I have reservations 
with the approach that the article 30 of EC Treaty does not have direct third-party 
applicability. It is different to support that is more methodologically correct to 
consider as effective a more special provision, like the article 102 of TFEU, than a 
more general, like the article 30 of EC Treaty from claiming that the article 30 of EC 
Treaty due to its generality or to its integration to a Statute that concerns, mainly 
Member States, defining their policy, does not have direct effect. Finally, the effect of 
the principle of “practical harmonization” is implied in the article 30 of EC Treaty. 
 As regards the criticism of the Advocate that the Court of First Instance does 
not define clearly the subject-matter of “intellectual property” and this creates 
problems to the consideration if the refusal of assignment is abusive, as this refusal is 
not subjected to in specific subject-matter of copyright, is correct *58ii. The “abusive 
exercise” of copyright is prohibited by the article 30 of EC Treaty. This legal 
consideration, of what can be judged as “abusive exercise” of copyright, is distinct 
from the consideration of comprehensive balance of the article 102 (86) of TFEU and 
is methodologically correct to be prior. Nevertheless, generally in practice, and in 
“Magill” case, it is difficult to prove the abusive exercise because, such an abuse, is 
demanded to be obvious and intentional. In addition, it is not logical to consider that 
is not subjected to in special subject-matter of copyright, every exercise of it that 
restricts the competition, as it was referred above such a restriction constitutes legal 
task of copyright. Also, we can consider that exceeds of this subject-matter, every 
exercise of copyright that distorts illegally the competition, as this is the demanded 
issue exactly. Therefore, this juridical reasoning would constitute “taking of 
question”. 
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 In paragraphs 64-68 referred the opinion of the CFI that the exercise of the 
exclusive right of reproduction does not constitute abuse, unless the circumstances 
and the conditions of exercise have obviously contrary purpose from that of the article 
102 (86) of TFEU, as in this case, this exercise exceeds to the scope of the essential 
function of copyright, which includes the moral protection and the reward for the 
intellectual creation. In this case, the implementation of EU law prevails. At this 
point, it is significant to do some notes. Despite the fact that the CFI concluded to the 
correct result, seems to confuse the examination of the abusive exercise of copyright - 
article 30 of EC Treaty – with the comprehensive balance - article 102 of TFEU -. 
Specially, under the fulfillment of special circumstances we lead to the conclusion 
that there is abuse of dominant position, not abusive exercise of copyright whose 
examination - of abusive exercise – requires the prior consideration of which is the 
subject-matter of copyright, if the behavior of the enterprise exceeds to this subject-
matter and the company’s behavior is intentional, not the consideration that, even 
though such exercise does not exceed this subject-matter, is unlawful as it may distort 
the free and fair competition. So, the CFI confused the meaning of “obvious abusive 
exercise” with the meaning of “abuse as a result of comprehensive balance”. This is 
the opinion of the General Advocate, who in paragraph 67 notes that: “as ITP in 
particular has pointed out, the aim of copyright is precisely to give the proprietor the 
possibility of restricting competition and that possibility must also be afforded to a 
dominant undertaking. The Court of First Instance’s premiss seems to be that the aim 
pursued by article 86 outweighs the aim of copyright”. In accordance with the thought 
72, the Advocate accepts that copyright includes a moral and a property right, which 
rational extension constitutes the right of reproduction. Therefore, the Advocate’s 
opinion was that the refusal to license was not abusive, as served the essential 
function of copyright. So, the EU law, in this case, does not supersede *59,60. The ECJ 
disagreed with the Advocate, as considers that this refusal is abusive, confirming the 
decision of CFI, however, as concerns the result, not the justification *61. 
 In my opinion, neither the copyright nor the provisions of competition law 
have an overriding effect in abstracto. As concerns the Advocate’s viewpoint, 
correctly counterclaims that the appellants’ behavior did not exceed the essential 
function due to the restriction of free competition, as the exercise of copyright leads 
inevitably to this restriction. So, the question is not whether this exercise restricts or 
not the competition, but if is unlawful. This can be solved applying the procedure of 
comprehensive balance taking into consideration the “exceptional circumstances”, as 
the ECJ did. Also, the claim that the creation of a TV guide does not require any 
specific creative effort, so there is not a legal reason in order the holder of copyright 
not to assign the copyright, is invalid, as what can be subjected to the protective scope 
is regulated by the national laws, not EU law, as the Advocated noted. The CFI’s 
opinion that the appellants’ behavior is abusive because the exercise of their copyright 
was conducting is such a way that exceeded the essential function of it, which is the 
protection of moral right of the holder of copyright, aiming to distort the free 
competition, can be taken into consideration only when the exercise of copyright has a 
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purpose that is obviously and exclusively contrary to the article 102 of TFEU, as in 
this case the article 102 is directly effective.  
At this point it is crucial to make a reference to the meaning of “anti-
competitive intent”. The theory distinguishes the analysis of the meaning of “anti-
competitive intent” from the meaning of “essential function”, but in practice their 
examination cannot be separate, as if the exercise of an IP right has an exclusively 
anti-competitive intent, this means that this IP right does not serve its essential 
function *62. This link between the two meanings is so narrow having as a result the 
General Advocate to examine them singly. Nevertheless, this means that the 
examination of the anti-competitive intent has the same problems as the examination 
of whether the exercise of copyright serves its essential function. The first is that the 
“anti-competitive intent” constitutes an indefinite legal meaning whose specification 
is necessary in every pending case. The second is that the anti-competitive intent and 
the effort of restriction competition is rational to exist and constitutes a lawful pursue 
of every company that aims to be dominant. So, the question is which the boundaries 
that must not be exceeded are in order this initially legitimate purpose not to become 
illegal. Finally, in order to be implemented the article 102 of TFEU, is required the 
potential and objective impact of open and fair trade between Member States due to 
an enterprise’s behavior regardless of the existence or non-existence of malice from 
the violator *63. Therefore, the examination of anti-competitive intent has to be taken 
into account by the court for the legal assessment of the appellants’ behavior, but 
cannot constitute determining criterion for the application of the article 102 of TFEU. 
That we can say is that if the behavior of the company has exclusively and obviously 
anti-competitive intent, is more probable to be challenged under the article 102. 
 In paragraphs 76-88 is tried the distinction between the subject-matter of the 
copyright and its essential function. More special, the General Advocate based on the 
articles 30-36 of EC Treaty, in paragraph 80, supports that the immaterial rights 
override to the protection of competition when the first fulfil their essential function. 
If is considered that this approach aims to the protection of the necessary core of the 
copyright that must not be harmed, even if this right must surrender in accordance 
with the principle of comprehensive balance, is correct. Therefore, this opinion 
constitutes a general rule of comprehensive balance when the conflict rights are based 
on hierarchically equal provisions, as it happens between the articles 30-36 of EC 
Treaty and 102 (86) of TFEU. Nevertheless, this opinion of Advocate has the 
meaning of an in abstracto prevailing of protection of IP rights against EU 
competition rules, ignoring the above comprehensive balance, so cannot be accepted. 
 In paragraphs 89-102 is analyzed the meaning of the “new product” for which 
there is a potential demand and the circumstances under which the “refusal of supply” 
is abusive. More special, in paragraph 91 is referred the article 86b of TFEU, in 
accordance with it: “an abuse of a dominant position may, in particular, consist in 
limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers”. 
In paragraph 94 is noted that the Commission’s opinion, is without significance for 
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the legal assessment of abuse whether the new product can compete the existing 
product that is protected by the copyright. In paragraphs 95-98, the General Advocate 
expresses his disagreement with the Commission’s opinion. In special, the Advocate 
considers that there in an abuse only in the cases in which the new product is possible 
to compete with the products that are protected by the copyright, as in these cases the 
copyright supersedes the safeguarding of free and fair competition, provided that the 
consumer’s demanding are satisfied sufficiently by the existing products. Even though 
the approach of the Advocate seems initially logical, contains some weaknesses. 
Firstly, the formation of article 102 of TFEU does not express or imply such a 
distinction, and for this reason, while we can say that when the new product can 
compete the existing products, is more probable, trying the in concreto comprehensive 
balance, to override the copyright, we cannot support that the copyright supersedes 
always and in abstracto in this case. Secondly, trying a teleological interpretation of 
the article 102, if we suppose that in the scope of this article is subjected only the 
situation in which the new product does not compete the products that are protected 
by copyright, we conclude the that scope of this article is very restrictive, as the 
reasons that may lead a company to such an anti-competitive behavior, provided that 
is not threatened by others rivals, are rare, even if the Advocate means that the 
criterion is not the absolute non-existence of competition, but the competition to be at 
least indirect. Thirdly, the Advocate’s approach takes into account only the aim of 
protection of consumers - article 86b -, however, the article 102 does not aim only to 
the protection of consumers, but and to the protection of the whole structure of 
competition and competitors *64. Finally, in paragraphs 99-102, the Advocate 
supports that the fact that a dominant enterprise does not have a general obligation to 
produce the goods for which possesses the license or to grant this license, as these 
choices are subjected to the subject-matter of copyright, does not constitute abusive 
behavior, apart from the cases in which the consumers do not have the possibility to 
supply this product or special circumstances exist. Nevertheless, this approach does 
not take into consideration the criterion of consumers’ potential demand. 
 In paragraphs 103-112 is considered the issue of use of a dominant position in 
one market in order to retain for itself a derivative market. As concerns the “Magill” 
case, is considered as main market the market for programme listings and as 
downstream market the market of television guides *65. More special, the Court of 
First Instance supported that there is analogy between the “Magill” case and the cases 
C-238/87, Volvo v Veng and C-53/87, CICRA v Renault. In paragraph 110, the 
Advocate counterclaimed that there is not analogy, as in “Magill” case the question 
does not concern only a “refusal of supply” of products to the customers who want to 
use them in downstream market, but a “refusal of granting of license” to competitors 
who want to manufacture or sell the products that are protected by copyright. We can 
say that this distinction is correct, but is not determining in order to settle the question 
in favor of protection of copyright. Actually, the Advocate’s approach confirms the 
initial question, which is if the “refusal of granting licensing” to the Magill, 
constitutes abusive behavior taking into account the special circumstances that exist, 
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even though such a refusal is subjected to in subject-matter of copyright. The opinion 
of Advocate - paragraphs 111 and 112 - that the examination whether the refusal of 
granting of licenses is abusive or not, does not related with the market in which the 
protected by copyright product is used, is in a hurry, as omits the fact that every 
market operates under different circumstances, which affect the operation of 
comprehensive balance that defines if will prevail finally the protection of copyright 
or the open competition. 
 In paragraphs 113-117 is analyzed the question if the behavior of the 
appellants constitutes discriminatory licensing policy or unreasonable licensing terms. 
The viewpoint of Advocate is sufficiently founded, as the holder of copyright has the 
legal possibility to define under which conditions and to what extent grants the 
license. Obviously, the target of the holder of copyright is the remuneration for 
assignment to cover and supersede the indirect damage that is suffered due to the 
opening of the competition after the granting of license. For this reason is possible to 
have the above legal possibility. In this case, it is apparent that the appellants did not 
want to grant the license in order to be used for the creation of weekly TV guide, as 
Magill wanted, but only the simple reproduction of daily programs and choices of 
weekly programs, as happened from the newspapers of Ireland and United Kingdom. 
So, there is not discriminatory licensing policy, as the existing situations, as concerns 
the Magill and the newspapers are not homogenous. If was happened the adverse, as if 
the power to publish a weekly TV guide was given to the Magill, while such power 
was not given to the newspapers, would exist discriminatory policy against to 
newspapers. In addition, the Magill did not justify sufficiently why the granting of 
license was conducted with unfair terms. Finally, is noted correctly, that the omission 
of ITP to prevent the publication of weekly TV guides in countries outside Ireland and 
United Kingdom must not be considered as implied granting of license, which 
constitutes discriminatory policy. The answer may be different if the illegal 
publication of such guides was happened in Ireland and the companies-appellants did 
not file an action against violators before the ECJ, as challenged against Magill. 
 In accordance with the paragraph 119, the Commission tried an autonomous 
EU interpretation of the meaning of “intellectual creation” supporting that the 
programme listings cannot be protected by copyright as their creation does not 
constitute innovation or is not based on research, but is based on mere factual 
information. Nevertheless, the Commission accepted finally that the definition of 
subject-matter of copyright belongs to national laws. In paragraphs 121 and 122, is 
referred that the appellants and the Advocate consider that the Commission and the 
Court of First Instance are centered substantially on the above autonomous EU 
interpretation. In paragraphs 124-127, the Advocate admits that the programme 
listings are not actually intellectual creations. Nevertheless, considers that this legal 
characterization is subjected to the power of national legislators, not to the ECJ, 
except for the examination of the limits of the passage b of the paragraph 36 of EC 
Treaty. Therefore, the interpretation of ECJ must be as strict as possible. Furthermore, 
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the Advocate expresses the consideration how the ECJ is competent to do the 
comprehensive balance between the protection of copyright and free competition, 
while simultaneously, does not have the power to define what can be characterized as 
“intellectual creation” and must be protected by copyright law. Personally, I agree at 
this point with the Advocate’s opinion, as, although the EU law supersedes to the 
national laws, the above autonomous EU interpretation cannot override to the national 
laws, because the EU law has assigned the power to the national legislators to define 
the meaning of “intellectual creation” and decide which the scope of copyright law is. 
So, we can support that the power of ECJ does not extend to challenge what can be 
considered as “intellectual creation” and must be protected by copyright, however, the 
ECJ has the possibility to assess the protected creation into the comprehensive 
balance between the protection of copyright and free competition. 
 The paragraphs 128-133 concern the central issue that is if the refusal of 
granting license is justified. In paragraph 129, the Advocate General expresses the 
opinion that there are not fulfilled special conditions under which the behavior of 
appellants must be considered as abusive, however, the Advocate does not justify 
specially and sufficiently its opinion. Also, in paragraph 131 the Advocate rebuts the 
ITP’s claim that the Commission did not mention the question whether the appellants’ 
behavior is objectively justifiable. At this point, it is crucial to note that the 
Commission’s general procedural obligation, which had before the Court of First 
Instance, was not constituted only to prove that the special circumstances under which 
the appellants’ behavior is considered as abusive existed, but in addition, to prove that 
this behavior, even if can be considered as abusive initially, cannot be justified 
objectively, in order to be considered as abusive finally and implemented the article 
102 of TFEU. So, the Commission had the burden of proof, as firstly, the 
Commission was the plaintiff before the CFI, secondly, does not exist presumption of 
EU law, in accordance with it the protection of free competition supersedes to 
copyright, and finally, in order to be implemented the article 102 of TFEU, is required 
to be fulfilled two criteria cumulatively. The first is the existence of special 
circumstances under which the refusal of granting license is abusive and the second is 
that this refusal cannot be justified objectively.  
 In paragraphs 134-143, is referred the issue of which may be the further 
consequences of the judgement of ECJ. More special, in accordance with thought 134, 
the Commission tries to distinguish the works to literally and artistic works stricto 
sensu and to functional or utilitarian works that are linked with telecommunication, 
computing, information technologies and databases arguing that in the first category 
the refusal of granting license is less probable to distort the competition in contrast to 
the second category. In accordance with the paragraph 135, the Advocate claimed 
correctly, in my opinion, that the above distinction does not concern the consideration 
of what can be subjected to the subject-matter of copyright, as this question concerns 
the national law exclusively, but is significant as concerns the legal assessment that is 
conducted between copyright and free competition in the procedure of comprehensive 
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balance. The Commission’s argument, in paragraph 136, that the ECJ’s judgement 
will produce important case law as concerns the sector of computer software and the 
counterclaim of ITP and IPO that the acceptance of Commission’s application will 
lead to an ineffective protection of copyright, cannot and must not be assessed legally 
from the ECJ. Actually, the special and sufficient justification of ECJ in every case 
affects the jurisprudence, even though is not binding for the others cases. In this case, 
the ECJ has to justify specially and sufficiently whether the refusal of granting license 
constitutes abusive practice - Advocate’s opinion in paragraph 141 -. In my opinion, 
the problem is not the impossibility to predict the consequences of the ECJ’s decision, 
but, that the consideration of these arguments constitutes methodological fault, as 
these worries of Commission and appellants are out of the scope of de lege lata 
interpretation, which is the duty of every court. So, this problematic concerns the 
policy of legislators, not the court. Finally, the worry of ITP that if the Commission’s 
application is accepted, will be created legal uncertainty, because the national courts 
will not know whether have to apply the national law of copyright or the EU law that 
protects competition, is invalid for three reasons. First of all, the national courts of 
every Member State have the legal possibility to file preliminary question as concerns 
the implementation of the article 102 of TFEU - Advocate’s notice in paragraph 142 -. 
Secondly, this legal uncertainty is inevitable, as the article 102 of TFEU constitutes 
applicable law before the national courts of Member States superseding to probable 
national provisions. Finally, the confrontation of legal uncertainty concerns mainly 
the legislators, EU and nationals, and alternately the ECJ - and every court - with the 
meaning that cannot be constituted criterion for settlement of a particular dispute the 
facing of legal uncertainty, if this demands the adoption of a solution that is not the 
more suitable taking into consideration the facts of the pending case.   
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5. The “Magill” case as a pioneer. The comparison with other relative 
cases 
 The “Magill” case, being subcategory of the more general practices of refusal 
of supply”, constitutes an innovation in the section of the abusive “refusal of 
licensing”, as others relative decisions of ECJ that followed and the above 
Commission’s Guidance was based on the criteria that was established in this case - 
“Magill” test -. The criteria concern the meaning of the “exceptional circumstances or 
conditions” that must exist in order to deviate from the general rule that the holders of 
copyright - or IPRs in general - has the freedom to assign or not, and to determine 
without restrictions the value of this assignment *66. So, the “refusal to license” is 
subjected to in scope of article 102 of TFEU if the following criteria are fulfilled. 
 First of all, if the “refusal of licensing” concerns a product that is 
indispensable for conducting the business in question, secondly, this refusal impedes 
the appearance of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand 
invoking harm to the consumers, thirdly, this refusal is probable to exclude all 
competition in downstream market and finally, this refusal cannot be justified 
objectively *67,68,69,70,71. This last criterion constitutes a general principle as concerns 
the issue of exceptions of the article 102. More special, in paragraph 54 of this 
decision the ECJ accepted that: “the appellants’ refusal to provide basic information 
by relying on national copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new 
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product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the 
appellants did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand” - first 
criterion -. Furthermore, the court accepted in paragraph 52 that: “among the 
circumstances taken into account by the Court of First Instance in concluding that 
such conduct was abusive was, first, the fact there was, according to the findings of 
the Court of First Instance, no actual or potential substitute for a weekly television 
guide offering information on the programmes for the week ahead….The Court of 
First Instance also established that there was a specific, constant and regular potential 
demand on the part of consumers” - second criterion -. As, it will become obvious to 
the next paragraphs, the ECJ in “Magill” case approached the meaning of the “new 
product with a more formalistic way in comparison with the following cases, which 
introduced some interpreting criteria based more on an economic-approach analysis. 
In accordance with the paragraph 56 of this decision: “the Court of First Instance also 
held, the appellants by their conduct, reserved to themselves the secondary market of 
weekly television guides by excluding all competition on that market since they 
denied access to the basic information which is the raw material indispensable for the 
compilation of such a guide” - third criterion -. Finally, in accordance in paragraph 55 
the Court accepted that: “there was no justification for such refusal either in the 
activity of television broadcasting or in that of publishing television magazines” - 
fourth criterion -.  
The case c-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs, 
substantially, confirmed the ‘Magill” criteria, however, interpreted them more strictly. 
In special, in “Bronner” case the ECJ decided that the dominant enterprise’s refusal to 
supply its products is not abusive when the rivals have the possibility to promote and 
sell their products without this supply, regardless of the fact that they would conduct 
their activity more easily whether possessed the dominant company’s product *72,73. 
This approach did not constitute an innovation, as it was adopted by the ECJ in 
“Ladbroke” case *74. Nonetheless, in “Bronner” case the ECJ added another 
condition, in accordance with it, the refusal of supply does not constitute an abusive 
practice if there are others products in market that can be operate as “alternatives”, on 
condition that their creation can simultaneously, compete effectively the dominant 
company’s product and is financially viable, even if these “alternatives” do not have 
the same quality, features or advantages as products of the dominant enterprise *75.  
 The ECJ in case C-504/93,Tierce Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, widened the scope of the meaning of “exceptional circumstances”. In 
special, in accordance with it, the article 102 of TFEU is effective, when the supply 
product that is refused is necessary for the exercise of the trade activity in question or 
this supply concerns a new product whose introduction might be impeded, even 
though there is a specific, constant, regular and potential demand on the part of 
consumers. The difference of this decision than of “Magill” decision is that these 
criteria is not required to exist cumulatively in order to be implemented the article 102 
*76.  
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 The ECJ in case 418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co.OHG v NDC Health GmbH 
& Co.KG, based on “Magill” criteria, broadened the third criterion, as accepted that 
the exclusion of competition in secondary market is not necessary to concern an 
“existing” market, but can be concern and a “hypothetical or fictional” market *77. 
Also, in “IMS” case, the second criterion was interpreted stricter, as the ECJ 
considered that the refusal of supply is abusive if the competitors intent to create a 
different product in order to satisfy the potential consumers’ demand, not only to 
duplicate the good of dominant enterprise *78,79. This criterion of “prevention of a new 
product” that could satisfy the potential consumers’ demand was used and in “Magill” 
case, however, in “IMS” case became clear the condition that the new product must 
not be same or similar with the dominant company’s product. Nevertheless, nor in 
“IMS” case, the ECJ determined the extent to which the new product is required to be 
different from that of the dominant enterprise *80. In addition, although the basic 
difference of “IMS” in comparison with “Magill” was that the refusal to license did 
not impede the creation of a new product, but the offering of a product that already 
existed in trade, the “IMS” consideration included the examination of market structure 
which was not duplicable making the whole situation “exceptional” *81. 
 Finally, it would be omission if we do not note the decision of ECJ in case T-
201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities. This decision 
constitutes a border stone as concerns the progression of consideration about the issue 
of “refusal of licensing”. This does not mean that this decision is differentiated 
substantially, from the ratio of “Magill”, but, interpreting in a more innovative 
manner the “Magill” criteria, added some extra thoughts that lead to the extension of 
the instances under which a “refusal to license” can be considered as abusive. More 
specific, in accordance with case T-201/04, the harm of consumers is probable not 
only when there is a restriction of offer of goods that would satisfy their potential 
demand, but also, when the restriction concerns the “technical development” *82,83. At 
this point, it is crucial to note that the consideration of the limiting technical progress 
as an “exceptional circumstance” having as a result the reversal of the structural 
conflict between IP rights whose ratio focuses on dynamic efficiency and competition 
law whose ratio is based on static or allocative efficiency *84. 
 Secondly, the ECJ adopted a wider definition of the meaning of 
“indispensability or necessity”, as accepted that in this meaning is not included only a 
good or a service that is necessary due to the fact that there is not a potential or actual 
substitute, but included and a circumstance of “economic indispensability”. More 
specific, the licensing is considered indispensable, when, even though, a competitor 
company has the knowledge and the ability to participate to the competition market, 
whether try to conduct his activity in a manner that desire, this participation will not 
be financially viable without the IP right *85,86. This approach had been supported and 
in “Bronner” case, as I referred above, but not so clearly as in “Microsoft” case *87. 
Finally, the ECJ in “Microsoft” case accepted that in order to be abusive the refusal of 
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supply, is sufficient the effective competition to be excluded probably and gradually, 
not at once *88,89. 
 In addition, the case T-201/04 put the issue of “innovation”, considering that 
constitutes object of the Court’s judgement if the incentives of innovation are best 
protected by the more strict or lenient prohibition of an enterprise’s behavior due to its 
dominant position *90,91. Generally, we can that the supporting opinions about this 
issue are two. In accordance with the first opinion - “Schumpeterian view” -, the 
“refusal of licensing” must be considered as lawful, as this behavior constitutes the 
rational result of dominance, which is the aim of every company that wants to 
succeed. Also, if we conclude that there is an obligation of “license”, the consequence 
will be the weakening of the incentives of competitors, as they will know that the 
company that achieve the innovation will be obliged to share it with them, even if is 
required a rational value *92. The opposite opinion constitutes to the belief as the free 
and fair a competition is as more competitors there are. Due to this situation, of 
effective competition, the enterprises will be obliged to offer more qualitied products 
or services at the lower possible price, giving to the consumers more and more 
favorable choices *93. The court adopted the second approach. We must not forget 
that this approach, which constitutes part of the general policy of EU and is purposed 
many times by the Commission’s legal acts, is based on the general economic 
ideology of EU of protective economic liberality. 
 Finally, in “Microsoft” case was discussed the issue of protection of “trade 
secrets” and more special, whether the refusal to disclose them, is constituted abusive 
practice, while this issue was not lodged in “Magill” case. The CFI in “Microsoft” 
expressed the opinion that the protection of trade secrets must be treated legally as the 
protection of IP rights, implying that trade secrets does not constitute a part of IP 
rights, however their significance is equivalent to IP rights. The Commission in its 
Decision, which preceded, in substance, supported the equivalent protection of IP 
rights with trade secrets, however without making clear if the latter constitute part of 
the first or simply must be implemented the same legal rules as concerns their 
disclosure *94. 
 Briefly, we can say that the crucial question is to what extent is lawful the 
refusal of dominant enterprise to disclose its trade secrets to rivals and if the EU 
competition rules are more lenient as concerns this refusal. Necessary prerequisite in 
order to answer this question is to clarify which the legal nature of “trade secrets” is  
*95. If we consider that “trade secrets” constitute simply an asset of firm that 
possesses them, the competition rules will be implemented stricter, in the contrary, if 
we consider that constitute a kind of IP rights, the implementation of EU competition 
law will be more lenient. 
 Generally, this issue can be solved by the application of comprehensive 
balance between the protection of trade secrets and free competition taking into 
consideration the specific circumstances of every case, like if the trade secrets 
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constitute innovation, are derived from a creative effort and which the grade of 
economic strength that give to its holder is. Thus, the standard of intervention of EU 
competition law against the refusal to share trade secrets is not always the same *96. 
This answer seems to be diplomatic, but is the unique realistic. Actually, is more 
probable not to obliged a holder of innovative trade secrets, even though are not 
fulfilled the criteria in order to be protected by the patent law, to disclose them rather 
than whether the refusal concerns an IP right, such as copyright, when the protected 
product is not the result of creative effort, as happened in “Magill” case. 
 As regards the question of the number of “exceptional circumstances”, it 
would be out of the ratio of the competition’s protection to consider that is exhaustive. 
This becomes apparent if we examine the legal facing of this issue to the “Magill” 
case and to others cases *97. So, if for instance, the company’s behavior is not 
subjected to the scope of the article 102b of TFEU, which constitutes a characteristic 
example of “exceptional circumstance”, as judged in “Microsoft” case, does not mean 
that the “exceptional circumstances” are not fulfilled in order to be characterized this 
behavior as “abusive”. 
 Furthermore, the theory of “exceptional circumstances” is effective in every 
conflict between the competition law and the exercise of any core IP right - in contrast 
to what is effective in legal system of USA-, not only when this exercise is constituted 
to the “refusal of license copyright” *98. As concerns the exercise of non-core IP 
rights, we can support that is more probable to supersede the competition law against 
them without the implementation of the theory of “exceptional circumstances”. 
 Finally, it has big interested the examination of the “essential facility” 
doctrine, as is relative with the theory of “exceptional circumstances”. The basic idea 
of this doctrine is that, if a dominant owner-company that possesses a product whose 
supply to the competitors is indispensable in order to have the possibility to compete 
the dominant enterprise, creating and selling a new product, has the obligation to 
provide it to competitors *99.  
 The danger of the wide scope of “essential facility” doctrine leaded the theory 
to a adopt a restrictive interpretation as possible as, introducing some extra criteria-
principles such as, the competitors not to be able to, not only to compete, but to 
compete effectively in these cases in which there are not practical alternatives or the 
duplication is impossible and to be probable the competitors’ activities to develop the 
competition by decreasing prices and promoting innovation. In order to be fulfilled 
this criterion, the competitors must not be content themselves with reproducing 
simply the same product of the dominant enterprise, but to add extra features or to 
improve it pursuing to satisfy potential consumers’ demand *100. 
 It is ambiguous whether the “essential facility” doctrine was used in “Magill” 
case. The one viewpoint is that in “Magill” this doctrine was not used explicitly *101, 
but in substance the theory of “exceptional circumstances”, constitutes a specification 
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of this doctrine. This approach is focuses on the element of “indispensability”. More 
special, the determining criterion is if the product of dominant company is absolute 
necessary, regardless of the fact that may not be a product that is protected by an IP 
right *102. On the contrary, the opponents counterclaim that ‘Magill” was not an 
“essential facility” case basing their argument on the structural and quality differences 
between a material good that belongs to a dominant company and a protected by an IP 
right’s subject-matter. In the latter case the prerequisites in order to be obliged the 
holder of copyright to assign its right must be interpreted as strictly as possible, 
because the protection of IP rights constitutes a conscious cession by the EU legislator 
against to the operation of free competition. The protective scope of IP rights is 
special, as is constituted to the material and moral reward of their holder and their 
assignment, even if the competitors pay in reasonable value, leads to the assimilation 
between the rightholder and others competitors *103. Therefore, in order to be 
enforced a holder of copyright to license for the use of the protected product is not 
required this product to constitute only “an essential facility” for the effective activity 
of others competitors, but to exist “exceptional circumstances”, under which the 
refusal to license to become unlawful abusive practice, even though initially, was a 
logical and legal right. 
 Therefore, it is true that the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” have 
been analyzed and interpreted clearly in cases of ECJ that followed the “Magill” case.  
Nevertheless, the “Magill” case constitutes the pioneer that have been developed the 
consideration in this issue, as firstly in this case the theory of “exceptional 
circumstances” were introduced. 
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III. Conclusion: The competition policy and IP rights. The Commission’s 
Guidance on article 82 of EC Treaty (now article 102 of TFEU) 
 
 As became obvious above, between EU competition law and IP rights there is 
not conflict actually, because pursue the same aim, which is to develop the fair 
competition enhancing simultaneously the consumers’ life. Their difference regards to 
the alternative way that follows each of them in order to achieve this goal *104. One of 
the most basic consequences of this opposition, which is confirmed by the various EU 
case law, is the existence of legal uncertainty, as the EU competition law have not 
succeed in creating a stable legal framework in which is defined exclusively under 
which conditions an IP rightholder, who in rebuttable presumption has the lawful 
choice to deny to share his right, is obliged to license. This gap is tried to be covered 
by the “comprehensive balance test” between the protection of IP rights and free 
competition, which is adopted by the EU jurisprudence, however, the dander of legal 
uncertainty still exists *105.  
The legal uncertainty can be restricted by the use of some guiding principles-
criteria that must be estimated by ECJ in every case in concreto. For example, it is 
crucial to examine in every situation which will be the financial consequences, if the 
rightholder obliged to license, to consumers’ welfare, if the competitors’ and 
consumers’ harm will be disproportionate intense whether the rightholder does not 
license in comparison with the rightholder’s harm if licenses, if the protected by IP 
right work is the result of a creativity effort or is subjected simply and in a formalistic 
way to IP law, if the protected by IP law work is absolutely necessary for the creation 
of the new product or simply make more convenient this creation and which should be 
the extent of EU law intervention against IP rights in order not to be harmed its core 
*106. 
 The Commission in order to help the law enforcers and undertakings tried to 
establish some guidelines in order to safeguard a minimum of legal predictability 
issuing the “Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive conduct by dominant undertakings”. The Advocate 
General Mazak in his opinion in the case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera 
Sverige AB, characterized this Guidance as a ‘useful point of reference” regardless of 
the fact that is not binding *107. Nonetheless, the Commission’s Guidance does not 
solve the problem. It is noted that even though its significance is big as concerns the 
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legal assessment, does not purport or substitute the effective law of article 102 of 
TFEU nor constitute binding law or an authentic interpretation tool whose use is 
obligatory by the ECJ *108.  
 This Guidance tries to clarify the conditions under which a refusal to license is 
abusive, but does not seem to succeed due to the reason that the using criteria and 
their formation does not constitute a stable legal basis for the definition of which 
behavior is abusive or justified rather than confirm the general existing legal 
framework, in which the Commission and further the ECJ will take its decision taking 
into consideration the special circumstances of the case. So, the element of 
subjectivity continues to prevail and in this Guidance, constituting a privileged and 
convenient field for the justification of any decision of Commission *109. 
 Furthermore, the Guidance’s logic is based on a structural unilateralism, 
because the determining criterion in order to consider whether a company’s behavior 
is abusive, is mainly, the consumers’ harm, ignoring the general competition policy of 
EU that does not concern only the consumers’ welfare, but and the protection of 
competitors and whole structure of free and fair competition *110. Also, it is 
remarkable that the Guidance is differentiated from the EU ruling as concerns the 
concept of the meaning of “consumers’ harm”, as in accordance with this Guidance, 
this criterion does not fulfilled only when the dominant enterprise’s behavior aims to 
impede the creation of a new good or technological development - paragraphs 85-88 
of Commission’s Guidance - *111.  
 Finally, the Commission in paragraph 89 of this Guidance removes implicitly 
the burden of proof, as concerns the negative effect of company’s incentives to invest 
and innovate, to the IP rightholder trespassing the general procedural rule that applies 
in disputes of private nature, in accordance with it, the applicant, who is more 
probable to be before the CFI - General Court - the rival of the dominant company 
that did not license its right, has the burden of proof to convince the Court that his 
claims are justified as concerns the merits and rightful as concerns the justa causa 
*112.  
 To sum up, the legal assessment if a company’s behavior is abusive can be 
achieved only with the implementation of the comprehensive balancing of interests in 
every case. This approach does not imply any preference in favor of free competition 
and against to dominant undertakings, but indicates the tendency of EU case law to 
adopt a more “economic-based approach” rather than a more “formalistic approach”. 
This choice is not without disadvantages, as the formalistic theory of protection of IP 
rights safeguards a minimum standard of legal certainty and under some 
circumstances, the aim of fair competition that is equivalent to that of free 
competition, however, the significance of individuality of every case would not be 
sufficiently assessed without the in concreto balance of the Court’s judgement. 
Therefore, as does not seem to be able the EU legislator to do such a balance, the role 
of EU jurisprudence is going to become more important.  
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Appendix I: 
EC Treaty: 
Chapter 2 — The elimination of quantitative restrictions as between Member States 
Article 30 
Quantitative restrictions on importation and all measures with equivalent effect shall, 
without prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be prohibited between Member 
States.  
Article 31 
Member States shall refrain from introducing as between themselves any new 
quantitative restrictions or measures with equivalent effect. 
This obligation shall, however, only apply to the level of liberalisation attained in 
application of the decisions of the Council of the Organisation for European 
Economic 
Co-operation of 14 January 1955. Member States shall communicate to the 
Commission, 
not later than six months after the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, the lists 
of 
the products liberalised by them in application of these decisions. The lists thus 
communicated shall be consolidated between Member States. 
Article 32 
Member States shall, in their mutual trade, refrain from making more restrictive the 
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quotas or measures with equivalent effect in existence at the date of the entry into 
force 
of this Treaty. 
Such quotas shall be abolished not later than at the date of the expiry of the 
transitional 
period. In the course of this period, they shall be progressively abolished under the 
conditions specified below. 
Article 33 
1. Each of the Member States shall, at the end of one year after the entry into force of 
this 
Treaty, convert any bilateral quotas granted to other Member States into global quotas 
open, without discrimination, to all other Member States. 
On the same date, Member States shall enlarge the whole of the global quotas so 
established in such a way as to attain an increase of not less than 20 per cent in their 
total 
value as compared with the preceding year. Each global quota for each product shall, 
however, be increased by not less than 10 per cent. 
The quotas shall be increased annually in accordance with the same rules and in the 
same 
proportions in relation to the preceding year. 
The fourth increase shall take place at the end of the fourth year after the date of the 
entry 
into force of this Treaty; the fifth increase shall take place at the end of a period of 
one 
year after the beginning of the second stage. 
2. Where, in the case of a product which has not been liberalised, the global quota 
does 
not amount to 3 per cent of the national output of the State concerned, a quota equal to 
not less than 3 per cent of such output shall be established not later than one year after 
the 
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date of the entry into force of this Treaty. At the end of the second year, this quota 
shall 
be raised to 4 per cent and at the end of the third year to 5 per cent. Thereafter, the 
Member State concerned shall increase the quota by not less than 15 per cent 
annually. 
In the case where there is no such national output, the Commission shall fix an 
appropriate quota by means of a decision.  
3. At the end of the tenth year, each quota shall be equal to not less than 20 per cent of 
the national output. 
4. Where the Commission, acting by means of a decision, finds that in the course of 
two 
successive years the imports of any product have been below the level of the quota 
granted, this global quota may not be taken into consideration for the purpose of 
calculating the total value of the global quotas. In such case, the Member State shall 
abolish the quota for the product concerned. 
5. In the case of quotas representing more than 20 per cent of the national output of 
the 
product concerned, the Council, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a 
proposal of the Commission, may reduce the minimum percentage of 10 per cent laid 
down in paragraph 1. This modification shall not, however, affect the obligation 
annually 
to increase the total value of global quotas by 20 per cent. 
6. Member States which have gone beyond their obligations concerning the level of 
liberalisation attained in implementation of the decisions of the Council of the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation of 14 January 1955 shall, when 
calculating the annual total increase of 20 per cent provided for in paragraph 1, be 
entitled to take into account the amount of imports liberalised by autonomous 
measures. 
Such calculation shall be submitted to the Commission for its prior approval. 
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7. Directives issued by the Commission shall lay down the procedure and the timing 
according to which Member States shall abolish as between themselves any measures 
which exist at the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and which have an effect 
equivalent to quotas. 
 
8. If the Commission finds that the application of the provisions of this Article and, in 
particular, of the provisions concerning percentages does not make it possible to 
ensure 
the progressive nature of the abolition of quotas provided for in Article 32, second 
paragraph, the Council, acting during the first stage by means of a unanimous vote 
and 
subsequently by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, 
may amend the procedure referred to in this Article and may, in particular, raise the 
percentages fixed. 
Article 34 
1. Quantitative restrictions on exportation and any measures with equivalent effect 
shall 
hereby be prohibited as between Member States. 
2. Member States shall abolish, not later than at the end of the first stage, all 
quantitative 
restrictions on exportation and any measures with equivalent effect in existence at the 
date of the entry into force of this Treaty. 
Article 35  
Member States hereby declare their willingness to abolish, in relation to other 
Member 
States, their quantitative restrictions on importation and exportation more rapidly than 
is 
provided for in the preceding Articles, if their general economic situation and the 
situation of the sector concerned so permit. 
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The Commission shall make recommendations for this purpose to the 
States concerned. 
Article 36 
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to prohibitions 
or 
restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit which are justified on 
grounds 
of public morality, public order, public safety, the protection of human or animal life 
or 
health, the preservation of plant life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historical or archaeological value or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property. 
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute either a means of 
arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
Article 37 
1. Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial 
character in such a manner as will ensure the exclusion, at the date of the expiry of the 
transitional period, of all discrimination between the nationals of Members States in 
regard to conditions of supply or marketing of goods. 
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body by means of which a Member 
State 
shall de jure or de facto either directly or indirectly control, direct or appreciably 
influence importation or exportation between Member States. These provisions shall 
apply also to monopolies assigned by the State. 
2. Member States shall abstain from any new measure which is contrary to the 
principles 
laid down in paragraph 1 or which may limit the scope of the Articles relating to the 
abolition, as between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative restrictions. 
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3. The timing of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be adapted to the 
abolition, 
as provided for in Articles 30 to 34 inclusive, of the quantitative restrictions on the 
same 
products. 
In cases where a product is subject to a State monopoly of a commercial character in 
one 
Member State or certain Member States only, the Commission may authorise the 
other 
Member States to apply, for as long as the adjustment referred to in paragraph 1 has 
not 
been carried out, measures of safeguard of which it shall determine the conditions and 
particulars. 
4. In the case of a monopoly of a commercial character which is accompanied by 
regulations designed to facilitate the marketing or the valorisation of agricultural 
products, 
it should be ensured that in the application of the rules of this Article equivalent 
guarantees are provided in respect of the employment and standard of living of the  
producers concerned, due account being taken of the timing in respect of possible 
adjustments and of necessary specialisations. 
5. The obligations incumbent on Member States shall be binding only to such extent 
as 
they are compatible with existing international agreements. 
6. The Commission shall, as soon as the first stage has begun, make recommendations 
as 
to the particulars and the timing according to which the adjustments referred to in this 
Article shall be carried out. 
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Appendix II: 
TFEU: 
TITLE VII 
 
COMMON RULES ON COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION 
OF LAWS 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
RULES ON COMPETITION 
 
SECTION 1 
 
RULES APPLYING TO UNDERTAKINGS 
 
Article 101 
 
(ex Article 81 TEC) 
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1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market, and in particular those which: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case 
of: 
 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
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which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; 
 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
 
Article 102 
 
(ex Article 82 TEC) 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
Article 103 
 
(ex Article 83 TEC) 
 
1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
 
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed in 
particular: 
 
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) and in 
Article 102 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments; 
 
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 101(3), taking into account 
the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify 
administration to the greatest possible extent on the other; 
 
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the 
provisions of Articles 101 and 102; 
 
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph; 
 
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained 
in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article. 
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Article 104 
 
(ex Article 84 TEC) 
 
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 103, the 
authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the internal market in 
accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions of Article 101, in 
particular paragraph 3, and of Article 102. 
 
Article 105 
 
(ex Article 85 TEC) 
 
1. Without prejudice to Article 104, the Commission shall ensure the application of 
the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102. On application by a Member State or 
on its own initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member 
States, which shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases of 
suspected infringement of these principles. If it finds that there has been an 
infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end. 
 
2. If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission shall record such 
infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. The Commission may publish 
its decision and authorise Member States to take the measures, the conditions and 
details of which it shall determine, needed to remedy the situation. 
 
3. The Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of agreement in 
respect of which the Council has adopted a regulation or a directive pursuant to 
Article 103(2)(b). 
 
Article 106 
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(ex Article 86 TEC) 
 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force 
any measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules 
provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109. 
 
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules 
contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the 
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the 
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to 
such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union. 
 
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and 
shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. 
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Appendix III: 
Joined cases: C-241/1991 P. and C-242/1991 P. of ECJ: 
61991J0241 
 
Judgment of the Court of 6 April 1995. - Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and 
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European 
Communities. - Competition - Abuse of a dominant position - Copyright. - Joined 
cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P.  
 
European Court reports 1995 Page I-00743 
 
 
Summary 
Parties 
Grounds 
Decision on costs 
Operative part 
Keywords 
 
++++ 
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1. Competition ° Dominant position ° Concept ° Monopoly of broadcasting 
companies over information relating to weekly programme listings 
 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 86) 
 
2. Competition ° Dominant position ° Copyright ° Weekly listings of television 
programmes ° Exercise of copyright ° Abuse ° Conditions 
 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 86) 
 
3. Appeal ° Grounds ° Mistaken assessment of the facts ° Inadmissible 
 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 168a; Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC, Art. 51) 
 
4. Competition ° Dominant position ° Effect on trade between Member States ° 
Criteria 
 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 86) 
 
5. International agreements ° Agreements concluded by Member States ° Agreements 
predating the EEC Treaty ° Justification of restrictions on intra-Community trade ° 
Not permissible ° Agreement ratified by a Member State already bound by the EEC 
Treaty ° Effects on the powers of the Community ° No effects 
 
(EEC Treaty, Arts 234 and 236) 
 
6. Competition ° Administrative proceedings ° Discontinuance of infringements ° 
Power of the Commission ° Orders addressed to undertakings 
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(Regulation No 17 of the Council, Art. 3) 
 
7. Competition ° Administrative proceedings ° Discontinuance of infringements ° 
Burdens imposed on undertakings ° Proportionality ° Criteria 
 
(Regulation No 17 of the Council, Art. 3) 
 
8. Competition ° Administrative proceedings ° Decision finding that there has been an 
infringement ° Statement of reasons ° Obligation ° Scope 
 
(EEC Treaty, Art. 190) 
 
Summary 
 
1. Broadcasting companies are in a dominant position within the meaning of Article 
86 of the Treaty when, by reason of their de facto monopoly over the information 
relating to the listings of their programmes, which are received in most households in 
one Member State and in a substantial portion of households in the adjoining part of 
another Member State, they are in a position to prevent effective competition on the 
market in weekly television magazines in the areas concerned. 
 
2. The conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position, consisting of the exercise of 
a right classified by national law as "copyright", cannot, by virtue of that fact alone, 
be exempt from review in relation to Article 86 of the Treaty. 
 
In the absence of Community standardization or harmonization of laws, determination 
of the conditions and procedures for granting protection of an intellectual property 
right is admittedly a matter for national rules and the exclusive right of reproduction 
forms part of the author' s rights, with the result that refusal to grant a licence, even if 
it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute 
abuse of a dominant position. 
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However, the exercise of an exclusive right by a proprietor may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct. Such will be the case when broadcasting 
companies rely on copyright conferred by national legislation to prevent another 
undertaking from publishing on a weekly basis information (channel, day, time and 
title of programmes) together with commentaries and pictures obtained independently 
of those companies, where, in the first place, that conduct prevents the appearance of 
a new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the 
companies concerned do not offer and for which there is a potential consumer 
demand, conduct which constitutes an abuse under heading (b) of the second 
paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty; where, second, there is no justification for that 
refusal either in the activity of television broadcasting or in that of publishing 
television magazines; and where, third, the companies concerned, by their conduct, 
reserve to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding 
all competition from the market through denial of access to the basic information 
which is the raw material indispensable for the compilation of such a guide. 
 
3. Pursuant to Article 168a of the Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the EEC, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to infringement of 
rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts. 
 
4. In order to satisfy the condition that trade between Member States must be affected 
within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, it is not necessary that the conduct in 
question should in fact have substantially affected that trade. It is sufficient to 
establish that the conduct is capable of having such an effect. This will be the case 
where an undertaking excludes all potential competitors on the geographical market 
consisting of one Member State and part of another Member State and thus modifies 
the structure of competition on that market, thereby affecting potential commercial 
exchanges between those Member States. 
 
5. The provisions of an agreement concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty or 
prior to a Member State' s accession, to which Article 234 of the Treaty applies, 
cannot be relied on in intra-Community relations if the rights of non-member 
countries are not involved. Where an agreement has been ratified by a Member State 
already bound by the Treaty, it cannot be relied on to limit the powers of the 
Community, as provided for in the Treaty, since the latter can be amended only in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 236. 
 
6. Article 3 of Regulation No 17 is to be applied according to the nature of the 
infringement found and may include an order to do certain acts or things which, 
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unlawfully, have not been done as well as an order to bring an end to certain acts, 
practices or situations which are contrary to the Treaty. 
 
7. In the context of the application of Article 3 of Regulation No 17, the principle of 
proportionality means that the burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an 
infringement of competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate and 
necessary to attain the objective sought, namely re-establishment of compliance with 
the rules infringed. 
 
8. Commission decisions intended to find infringements of competition rules, issue 
directions and impose pecuniary sanctions must state the reasons on which they are 
based, in accordance with Article 190 of the Treaty, which requires the Commission 
to set out the reasons which prompted it to adopt a decision, so that the Court can 
exercise its power of review and Member States and nationals concerned know the 
basis on which the Treaty has been applied. The Commission cannot, however, be 
required to discuss all the matters of fact and law which may have been dealt with 
during the administrative proceedings. 
 
Parties 
 
In Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 
 
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE), a public authority having its office in Dublin, 
represented by W. Alexander and G. van der Wal, Advocates, instructed by G.F. 
McLaughlin, Director of Legal Affairs of Radio Telefis Eireann, and by E. Murphy, 
Solicitor, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Arendt & 
Medernach, 8-10 Rue Mathias Hardt (C-241/91 P), 
 
and 
 
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP), a company incorporated under 
English law, having its registered office in London, represented by M. J. Reynolds 
and R. Strivens, Solicitors, and Alan Tyrrell, QC, with an address for service in 
Luxembourg at the Chambers of Zeyen, Beghin & Feider, 67 Rue Ermesinde (C-
242/91 P), 
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appellants, 
 
supported by 
 
Intellectual Property Owners Inc. (IPO), having its registered office in Washington, 
D.C., United States of America, represented by D.R. Barrett and G.I.F. Leigh, 
Solicitors, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of Bonn & 
Schmitt, 62 Avenue Guillaume, 
 
intervener, 
 
APPEALS against two judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities (Second Chamber) of 10 July 1991 in Case T-69/89 RTE v Commission 
[1991] ECR II-485 and in Case T-76/89 ITP v Commission [1991] ECR II-575, 
seeking to have those judgments set aside, 
 
the other party to the proceedings being: 
 
Commission of the European Communities, represented by Julian Currall, of its Legal 
Service, acting as Agent, and I.S. Forrester, QC, with an address for service in 
Luxembourg at the office of G. Kremlis, also of the Legal Service, Wagner Centre, 
Kirchberg, 
 
supported by 
 
Magill TV Guide Ltd, having its registered office in Dublin, represented by Gore & 
Grimes, Solicitors, and J.D. Cooke, SC, with an address for service in Luxembourg at 
the Chambers of Louis Schiltz, 83 Boulevard Grande-Duchesse Charlotte, 
 
intervener at first instance, 
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THE COURT, 
 
composed of: G.C. Rodríguez Iglesias (Rapporteur), President, F.A. Schockweiler and 
P.J.G. Kapteyn (Presidents of Chambers), G.F. Mancini, C.N. Kakouris, J.C. 
Moitinho de Almeida and J.L. Murray, Judges, 
 
Advocate General: C. Gulmann, 
 
Registrar: L. Hewlett, Administrator, 
 
having regard to the Report for the Hearing, 
 
after hearing oral argument from the parties at the hearing on 1 December 1993, at 
which Radio Telefis Eireann was represented by W. Alexander and G. van der Wal, 
Advocates; Independent Television Publications Ltd by A. Tyrrell, QC, R. Strivens, 
Solicitor, and T. Skinner, Barrister; the Commission by J. Currall, of its Legal 
Service, and I.S. Forrester, QC; Magill TV Guide Ltd by J.D. Cooke, SC; and 
Intellectual Property Owners by G.I.F. Leigh, Solicitor, and D. Vaughan, QC, 
 
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 1 June 1994, 
 
gives the following 
 
Judgment 
 
Grounds 
 
1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 19 September 1991, Radio Telefis 
Eireann ("RTE"), notified of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-
 64 
 
69/89 RTE v Commission [1991] ECR II-485 ("the RTE judgment") on 10 July 1991, 
the date of judgment, appealed against that judgment on the ground of non-
compliance with Community law. 
 
2 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 19 September 1991, Independent 
Television Publications Ltd ("ITP"), notified of the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 10 July 1991 in Case T-76/89 ITP v Commission [1991] ECR II-575 ("the 
ITP judgment") on 12 July 1991, appealed against that judgment on the ground of 
non-compliance with Community law. 
 
3 By two applications lodged at the Registry on 6 January 1992, Intellectual Property 
Owners Inc. ("IPO") sought leave to intervene in the two cases in support of the forms 
of order sought by the appellants. By two orders of 25 March 1992 the Court granted 
IPO leave to intervene. 
 
4 By an order of the President of the Court of Justice of 21 April 1993, Cases C-
241/91 P and C-242/91 P were joined for the purposes of the oral procedure. 
 
5 Since the two cases concern the same subject-matter, it is appropriate for them to be 
joined for the purposes of the judgment, in accordance with Article 43 of the Rules of 
Procedure. 
 
6 According to the judgments of the Court of First Instance, most households in 
Ireland and 30% to 40% of households in Northern Ireland can receive television 
programmes broadcast by RTE, ITV and BBC. 
 
7 At the material time, no comprehensive weekly television guide was available on 
the market in Ireland or in Northern Ireland. Each television station published a 
television guide covering exclusively its own programmes and claimed, under Irish 
and United Kingdom legislation, copyright protection for its own weekly programme 
listings in order to prevent their reproduction by third parties. 
 
8 RTE itself published its own weekly television guide, while ITV did so through ITP, 
a company established for that purpose. 
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9 ITP, RTE and BBC practised the following policy with regard to the dissemination 
of programme listings. They provided their programme schedules free of charge, on 
request, to daily and periodical newspapers, accompanied by a licence for which no 
charge was made, setting out the conditions under which that information could be 
reproduced. Daily listings and, if the following day was a public holiday, the listings 
for two days, could thus be published in the press, subject to certain conditions 
relating to the format of publication. Publication of "highlights" of the week was also 
authorized. ITP, RTE and the BBC ensured strict compliance with the licence 
conditions by instituting legal proceedings, where necessary, against publications 
which failed to comply with them. 
 
10 Magill TV Guide Ltd ("Magill") attempted to publish a comprehensive weekly 
television guide but was prevented from doing so by the appellants and the BBC, 
which obtained injunctions prohibiting publication of weekly television listings. 
 
11 Magill lodged a complaint with the Commission on 4 April 1986 under Article 3 
of Regulation No 17 of the Council of 6 February 1962, the First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (OJ, English Special Edition 1959-
1962, p. 87) ("Regulation No 17") seeking a declaration that the appellants and the 
BBC were abusing their dominant position by refusing to grant licences for the 
publication of their respective weekly listings. The Commission decided to initiate a 
proceeding, at the end of which it adopted Decision 89/205/EEC of 21 December 
1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.851 ° Magill 
TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE) (OJ 1989 L 78, p. 43) ("the decision"), which was the 
subject-matter of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance. 
 
12 In that decision the Commission found that there had been a breach of Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty and ordered the three organizations to put an end to that breach, in 
particular "by supplying ... third parties on request and on a non-discriminatory basis 
with their individual advance weekly programme listings and by permitting 
reproduction of those listings by such parties". It was also provided that, if the three 
organizations chose to grant reproduction licences, any royalties requested should be 
reasonable. 
 
13 By order of 11 May 1989 in Joined Cases 76, 77 and 91/89 R RTE and Others v 
Commission [1989] ECR 1141, the President of the Court of Justice, at the request of 
the applicants, ordered suspension "of the operation of Article 2 of the ... decision in 
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so far as it obliges the applicants to bring the infringement found by the Commission 
to an end forthwith by supplying each other and third parties on request and on a non-
discriminatory basis with their individual advance weekly programme listings and by 
permitting reproduction of those listings by such parties". 
 
14 At first instance the two appellants sought annulment of the Commission decision 
and an order requiring it to pay the costs of the proceedings. 
 
15 The Court of First Instance dismissed the appellants' applications and ordered them 
to pay the costs. 
 
16 RTE claims that the Court of Justice should: 
 
"1. quash the judgment of the Court of First Instance; 
 
2. annul the decision of the Commission of 21 December 1988; 
 
3. order the Commission and the intervener to pay the costs." 
 
17 ITP requests the Court of Justice to: 
 
"1. quash the judgment of the Court of First Instance dated 10 July 1991 in Case T-
76/89 ITP v Commission and itself give final judgment in the matter; 
 
2. declare Commission Decision IV/31.851 of 21 December 1988 (Magill TV 
Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE) void; and 
 
3. order the Commission and/or the intervener to pay the costs of ITP in the Court of 
First Instance and the Commission to pay the costs of ITP in this Court." 
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18 The Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the appeals, order each 
appellant to bear the costs of the proceedings brought by it and order IPO to bear the 
costs incurred by the Commission by virtue of IPO' s intervention. 
 
19 In the alternative, in the event that the Court of Justice should hold, contrary to the 
Commission' s submissions, that the judgments of the Court of First Instance must be 
quashed on a particular point, the Commission submits that the Court of Justice 
should none the less confirm the operative parts of the judgments of the Court of First 
Instance while substituting its own reasoning in accordance with the judgment in Case 
C-30/91 P Lestelle v Commission [1992] ECR I-3755. The Commission contends that 
the operative parts of the judgments, which upheld the Commission' s decision, are 
sound since the conduct complained of in this case was evidently abusive, harmed the 
interests of consumers, drove Magill' s multi-channel guide out of the market, 
restricted trade between Member States and was intended (at least by two of the three 
applicants) to restrict such trade. 
 
20 IPO claims that the Court should set aside the two judgments of the Court of First 
Instance, annul the decision of the Commission and order the Commission to bear 
IPO' s costs before the Court of Justice. 
 
21 RTE relies on three pleas in law in support of its appeal. The first is that the Court 
of First Instance misconstrued the concept of abuse of a dominant position contained 
in Article 86 of the Treaty. The second is that the Court of First Instance misconstrued 
the concept of effects on trade between Member States. The third is that the Court of 
First Instance wrongly refused to take into consideration the Berne Convention of 
1886. 
 
22 ITP, in support of its appeal, relies on the first plea raised by RTE, along with two 
further pleas in law. The first is that the Court of First Instance misconstrued Article 3 
of Regulation No 17 by holding that the Commission had the power to require a 
proprietor of intellectual property rights to grant compulsory licences. The second is 
that Article 190 of the Treaty was infringed in so far as the Court of First Instance 
held that the reasoning of the decision satisfied the conditions relating to observance 
of the rights of the defence. 
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23 In its two statements in intervention, IPO particularly supports the plea common to 
both ITP and RTE, namely that the Court of First Instance misconstrued the concept 
of abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty. 
 
The existence of an abuse of a dominant position 
 
24 So far as the existence of a dominant position is concerned, the Court of First 
Instance held that "ITP enjoyed, as a consequence of its copyright in ITV and Channel 
4 programme listings, which had been transferred to it by the television companies 
broadcasting on those channels, the exclusive right to reproduce and market those 
listings. It was thus able, at the material time, to secure a monopoly over the 
publication of its weekly listings in the TV Times, a magazine specializing in the 
programmes of ITV and Channel 4". Consequently, in the opinion of the Court of 
First Instance, "the applicant clearly held at that time a dominant position both on the 
market represented by its weekly listings and on the market for the magazines in 
which they were published in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Third parties such as 
Magill who wished to publish a general television magazine were in a situation of 
economic dependence on the applicant, which was thus in a position to hinder the 
emergence of any effective competition on the market for information on its weekly 
programmes" (ITP judgment, paragraph 49). With regard to RTE, the Court of First 
Instance reached the same conclusion in nearly identical terms (RTE judgment, 
paragraph 63). 
 
25 So far as the existence of an abuse of that dominant position was concerned, the 
Court of First Instance considered that it was necessary to interpret Article 86 in the 
light of copyright in programme listings. It pointed out that, in the absence of 
harmonization of national rules or Community standardization, determination of the 
conditions and procedures under which copyright was protected was a matter for 
national rules (ITP judgment, paragraphs 50 and 51). The relationship between 
national intellectual property rights and the general rules of Community law was 
governed expressly by Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, which provided for the 
possibility of derogating from the rules relating to the free movement of goods on 
grounds of the protection of industrial or commercial property, subject to the 
conditions set out in the second sentence of Article 36. Article 36 thus emphasized 
that the reconciliation between the requirements of the free movement of goods and 
the respect to which intellectual property rights were entitled had to be achieved in 
such a way as to protect the legitimate exercise of such rights, which alone was 
justified within the meaning of that article, and to preclude any improper exercise 
thereof likely to create artificial partitions within the market or pervert the rules 
governing competition within the Community. The Court of First Instance took the 
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view that the exercise of intellectual property rights conferred by national legislation 
had consequently to be restricted as far as was necessary for that reconciliation (ITP 
judgment, paragraph 52). 
 
26 The Court of First Instance found, in the light of the case-law of the Court of 
Justice, that it followed from Article 36 of the Treaty that only those restrictions on 
freedom of competition, free movement of goods or freedom to provide services 
which were inherent in the protection of the actual substance of the intellectual 
property right were permitted in Community law. It based its view in particular on the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro 
[1971] ECR 487, paragraph 11, in which the Court of Justice held that, although it 
permitted prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of products which were 
justified for the purpose of protecting industrial and commercial property, Article 36 
only admitted derogations from that freedom to the extent to which they were justified 
for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constituted the specific subject-matter of 
such property (ITP judgment, paragraph 54). 
 
27 The Court of First Instance then observed that in principle the protection of the 
specific subject-matter of a copyright entitled the copyright-holder to reserve the 
exclusive right to reproduce the protected work (ITP judgment, paragraph 55). 
 
28 However, the Court of First Instance took the view that, while it was plain that the 
exercise of the exclusive right to reproduce a protected work was not in itself an 
abuse, that did not apply when, in the light of the details of each individual case, it 
was apparent that that right was being exercised in such ways and circumstances as in 
fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 86. In that event, 
the Court of First Instance continued, the copyright was no longer being exercised in a 
manner which corresponded to its essential function, within the meaning of Article 36 
of the Treaty, which was to protect the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward 
for the creative effort, while respecting the aims of, in particular, Article 86. From this 
the Court of First Instance concluded that the primacy of Community law, particularly 
as regards principles as fundamental as those of the free movement of goods and 
freedom of competition, prevailed over any use of a rule of national intellectual 
property law in a manner contrary to those principles (ITP judgment, paragraph 56). 
 
29 In the present case, the Court of First Instance noted that the applicants, by 
reserving the exclusive right to publish their weekly television programme listings, 
were preventing the emergence on the market of a new product, namely a general 
television magazine likely to compete with their own magazines. The applicants were 
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thus using their copyright in the programme listings produced as part of the activity of 
broadcasting in order to secure a monopoly in the derivative market of weekly 
television guides in Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Court of First Instance also 
regarded it as significant in that regard that the applicants had authorized, free of 
charge, the publication of their daily listings and highlights of their weekly 
programmes in the press in both Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
 
30 The Court of First Instance accordingly took the view that conduct of that type ° 
characterized by preventing the production and marketing of a new product, for which 
there was potential consumer demand, on the ancillary market of weekly television 
guides and thereby excluding all competition from that market solely in order to 
secure the applicants' respective monopolies ° clearly went beyond what was 
necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright as permitted in Community 
law. The applicants' refusal to authorize third parties to publish their weekly listings 
was, in this case, the Court of First Instance ruled, arbitrary in so far as it was not 
justified by the requirements peculiar to the activity of publishing television 
magazines. It was thus possible for the applicants to adapt to the conditions of a 
television magazine market which was open to competition in order to ensure the 
commercial viability of their weekly publications. The applicants' conduct could not, 
in those circumstances, be covered in Community law by the protection conferred by 
their copyright in the programme listings (ITP judgment, paragraph 58). 
 
31 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court of First Instance found that, 
although the programme listings were at the material time protected by copyright as 
laid down by national law, which still determined the rules governing that protection, 
the conduct at issue could not qualify for such protection within the framework of the 
necessary reconciliation between intellectual property rights and the fundamental 
principles of the Treaty concerning the free movement of goods and freedom of 
competition. The aim of that conduct was clearly incompatible with the objectives of 
Article 86 (ITP judgment, paragraph 60). 
 
32 The Court of First Instance accordingly dismissed the plea in law based on breach 
of Article 86. 
 
33 RTE, supported by IPO, relies on the judgment in Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng 
[1988] ECR 6211 in arguing that the exercise by an owner of intellectual property 
rights of his exclusive rights, in particular his refusal to grant a licence, cannot in 
itself be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position. 
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34 According to RTE, ITP and IPO, one of the essential rights of the owner of a 
copyright, without which that right would be deprived of its substance, is the 
exclusive right of reproduction. That right, which has not been placed in question by 
the Treaty rules, entitles its holder to be rewarded by the exclusive sale of the 
products incorporating the protected work and to prevent competition by a third party 
in respect of those products. 
 
35 ITP denies that the exercise of the exclusive right of reproduction is itself an abuse 
where it is in pursuit of an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 86 (ITP 
judgment, paragraph 56) since copyright owners ordinarily and naturally exercise 
their copyright in order to restrict competition with their own product by other 
products made using their copyright material, even on a derived market. That, it 
continues, is the essence of copyright. 
 
36 IPO considers that copyright is by nature beneficial for competition, pointing out 
that it attributes exclusive proprietorial rights only to a particular expression of an 
idea or concept, not to the concept or idea itself. 
 
37 RTE and IPO point out that, in the absence of Community harmonization, the 
scope of national copyright laws can be defined only by the legislature of each 
Member State. The definition of that scope cannot be altered by a measure adopted in 
implementation of Article 86, but only by specific Community legislation. 
 
38 Moreover, according to RTE, the right of first marketing has been considered in 
the case-law of the Court of Justice as the specific subject-matter of all industrial 
property rights. 
 
39 RTE contends that the owner of an intellectual property right is under no 
obligation to offer justification for his refusal to grant a licence, contrary to the view 
taken by the Court of First Instance. ITP adds that this view of the Court of First 
Instance is not supported by the case-law of the Court of Justice and that, due to the 
imprecision of the criteria used, it undermines legal certainty for copyright owners. 
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40 According to RTE and IPO, a refusal, by the owner of a right, to grant a licence 
forms part of the specific subject-matter of his exclusive right. RTE considers that this 
would constitute an abuse only in very particular circumstances and IPO adds that the 
use of an intellectual property right is justified if it is within the scope of the specific 
subject-matter of the right in question. 
 
41 IPO and RTE criticize the approach, adopted by the Court of First Instance and the 
Commission in this case, of seeing copyright as a mere combination of the right of 
attribution of authorship and the right to compensation for exploitation. IPO claims 
that this is in marked contrast not only to the laws of the various Member States but 
also to the Berne Convention and would represent a significant diminution of the 
protection afforded by copyright. ITP adds that this view overlooks the right of 
exclusive reproduction and distinguishes between the protection of moral rights and 
the protection of commercial rights with the result that assignees of the creator ° such 
as ITP ° cannot avail themselves of moral rights, which are inalienable, and will 
therefore be unable to exercise the right of exclusive reproduction. 
 
42 RTE submits that consumer demand cannot justify application of Article 86 to the 
present cases and that it is for the national legislature alone to remedy such a situation, 
as has been done in the United Kingdom. ITP adds that it is ordinarily the case that a 
copyright owner who sells his own product made from his copyright material deprives 
consumers of the opportunity of obtaining it elsewhere. 
 
43 Next, according to IPO, there is no presumption that the holder of an intellectual 
property right is in a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 (judgments 
in Case 40/70 Sirena v EDA and Others [1971] ECR 69 and Case 78/70 Deutsche 
Grammophon, cited above). Relying in particular on the judgment in Case 322/81 
Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, IPO takes the view that a dominant 
position presupposes a position of economic strength and for that reason it calls in 
question the analysis of the Court of First Instance that the appellants were dominant 
merely because they held copyrights without reference to any analysis whatever of 
economic power in the marketplace. 
 
44 IPO also criticizes the Commission for having failed to apply the criterion of 
dominant position based on economic power and having taken the view that the 
appellants and the BBC held a factual monopoly. In doing so, the Commission takes 
the view that a factual monopoly is likely to arise wherever there exists a primary 
market and a secondary market and a third party wishes to avail itself of the products 
or services on the primary market in order to carry on business on the secondary 
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market. According to IPO, the Commission considers that such a situation will result 
in a position of economic dependence which is characteristic of the existence of a 
dominant position. 
 
45 IPO criticizes this conception in so far as it artificially links economic dependence 
with the intention of a third party, who would always have the possibility of 
undertaking some other economic venture. For IPO, the concept of "factual 
monopoly" appears to be an artificial construct whereby the Commission seeks to 
justify the use of competition law in order to change the specific subject-matter of 
copyright. 
 
(a) Existence of a dominant position 
 
46 So far as dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that 
mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a position. 
 
47 However, the basic information as to the channel, day, time and title of 
programmes is the necessary result of programming by television stations, which are 
thus the only source of such information for an undertaking, like Magill, which 
wishes to publish it together with commentaries or pictures. By force of circumstance, 
RTE and ITP, as the agent of ITV, enjoy, along with the BBC, a de facto monopoly 
over the information used to compile listings for the television programmes received 
in most households in Ireland and 30% to 40% of households in Northern Ireland. The 
appellants are thus in a position to prevent effective competition on the market in 
weekly television magazines. The Court of First Instance was therefore right in 
confirming the Commission' s assessment that the appellants occupied a dominant 
position (see the judgment in Case 322/81 Michelin, cited above, paragraph 30). 
 
(b) Existence of abuse 
 
48 With regard to the issue of abuse, the arguments of the appellants and IPO wrongly 
presuppose that where the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position consists 
of the exercise of a right classified by national law as "copyright", such conduct can 
never be reviewed in relation to Article 86 of the Treaty. 
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49 Admittedly, in the absence of Community standardization or harmonization of 
laws, determination of the conditions and procedures for granting protection of an 
intellectual property right is a matter for national rules. Further, the exclusive right of 
reproduction forms part of the author' s rights, so that refusal to grant a licence, even 
if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself constitute 
abuse of a dominant position (judgment in Case 238/87 Volvo, cited above, 
paragraphs 7 and 8). 
 
50 However, it is also clear from that judgment (paragraph 9) that the exercise of an 
exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive 
conduct. 
 
51 In the present case, the conduct objected to is the appellants' reliance on copyright 
conferred by national legislation so as to prevent Magill ° or any other undertaking 
having the same intention ° from publishing on a weekly basis information (channel, 
day, time and title of programmes) together with commentaries and pictures obtained 
independently of the appellants. 
 
52 Among the circumstances taken into account by the Court of First Instance in 
concluding that such conduct was abusive was, first, the fact that there was, according 
to the findings of the Court of First Instance, no actual or potential substitute for a 
weekly television guide offering information on the programmes for the week ahead. 
On this point, the Court of First Instance confirmed the Commission' s finding that the 
complete lists of programmes for a 24-hour period ° and for a 48-hour period at 
weekends and before public holidays ° published in certain daily and Sunday 
newspapers, and the television sections of certain magazines covering, in addition, 
"highlights" of the week' s programmes, were only to a limited extent substitutable for 
advance information to viewers on all the week' s programmes. Only weekly 
television guides containing comprehensive listings for the week ahead would enable 
users to decide in advance which programmes they wished to follow and arrange their 
leisure activities for the week accordingly. The Court of First Instance also 
established that there was a specific, constant and regular potential demand on the part 
of consumers (see the RTE judgment, paragraph 62, and the ITP judgment, paragraph 
48). 
 
53 Thus the appellants ° who were, by force of circumstance, the only sources of the 
basic information on programme scheduling which is the indispensable raw material 
for compiling a weekly television guide ° gave viewers wishing to obtain information 
on the choice of programmes for the week ahead no choice but to buy the weekly 
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guides for each station and draw from each of them the information they needed to 
make comparisons. 
 
54 The appellants' refusal to provide basic information by relying on national 
copyright provisions thus prevented the appearance of a new product, a 
comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the appellants did not 
offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand. Such refusal constitutes 
an abuse under heading (b) of the second paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty. 
 
55 Second, there was no justification for such refusal either in the activity of 
television broadcasting or in that of publishing television magazines (RTE judgment, 
paragraph 73, and ITP judgment, paragraph 58). 
 
56 Third, and finally, as the Court of First Instance also held, the appellants, by their 
conduct, reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by 
excluding all competition on that market (see the judgment in Joined Cases 6/73 and 
7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECR 223, paragraph 25) since they 
denied access to the basic information which is the raw material indispensable for the 
compilation of such a guide. 
 
57 In the light of all those circumstances, the Court of First Instance did not err in law 
in holding that the appellants' conduct was an abuse of a dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty. 
 
58 It follows that the plea in law alleging misapplication by the Court of First Instance 
of the concept of abuse of a dominant position must be dismissed as unfounded. It is 
therefore unnecessary to examine the reasoning of the contested judgments in so far 
as it is based on Article 36 of the Treaty. 
 
Effects on trade between Member States (second plea in the appeal in Case C-241/91 
P) 
 
59 With regard to the effects on trade between Member States, the Court of First 
Instance first reviewed the case-law of the Court of Justice (paragraph 76 of the RTE 
judgment) before finding (at paragraph 77) that "the applicant' s conduct modified the 
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structure of competition on the market for television guides in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland and thus affected potential trade flows between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom." 
 
60 The reasons given by the Court of First Instance for this conclusion were based on 
the effects of RTE' s refusal to authorize third parties to publish its weekly listings on 
the structure of competition in the territory of Ireland and Northern Ireland. These, the 
Court of First Instance found, excluded all potential competition on the market in 
question, "thus in effect maintaining the partitioning of the markets ... [of] Ireland and 
Northern Ireland respectively." It found that the appreciable effect which the policy in 
question had on potential commercial exchanges between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom was evidenced by the specific demand for a general television magazine. 
The Court of First Instance added that "the relevant geographical area, within which a 
single market in television broadcasting services has already been achieved, likewise 
represents a single market for information on television programmes, particularly 
since trade is greatly facilitated by a common language" (paragraph 77). 
 
61 RTE states that Community competition rules are not intended to remedy 
situations which are purely internal to a Member State and it disputes the finding of 
the Court of First Instance that RTE had "in effect maintain[ed] the partitioning of the 
markets represented by Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively." RTE asserts that it 
has observed one and the same policy in respect of the supply of weekly programme 
listings and licensing, irrespective of the place of establishment of the undertakings 
concerned. It denies ever having stopped or hindered the export or import of 
television guides. 
 
62 RTE also recalls the following facts, which are supported by the findings of the 
Commission and the Court of First Instance: 
 
(i) outside Ireland, RTE' s programmes are received only in part of Northern Ireland, 
which represents less than 1.6% of the United Kingdom television market and less 
than 0.3% of the EEC television market; 
 
(ii) according to the findings of the High Court of Ireland, the RTE signal is received 
by 30% to 40% of the population of Northern Ireland; 
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(iii) sales of RTE' s television guide in the United Kingdom are less than 5% of sales 
in Ireland. 
 
63 RTE adds that it does not have programmes or commercials aimed at or broadcast 
to Northern Ireland. Its programmes can be received in Northern Ireland only because 
of "overspill". In Northern Ireland, approximately 100 000 households receive RTE 
programmes and 5 000 copies of RTE' s television guide are sold. 
 
64 According to RTE, these facts demonstrate the marginal importance of the cross-
border sales of weekly guides containing RTE' s programmes. 
 
65 Moreover, following the new licensing policy applied by RTE, it appears that: 
 
(i) sales in Ireland of Radio Times and TV Times, originating in the United Kingdom, 
have decreased; 
 
(ii) sales in Northern Ireland of the RTE Guide, originating in Ireland, have not 
increased; in general the inclusion of RTE' s programme listings in a multi-channel 
guide does not appreciably affect sales figures of such a guide in Northern Ireland; 
 
(iii) no other publishers have availed themselves of the new possibility of publishing 
comprehensive weekly television guides, including RTE' s programmes, and of 
selling them across the border. 
 
66 RTE concludes from this information that its licensing policy, condemned by the 
Commission decision, has had no effect, or no more than an insignificant effect, on 
commercial exchanges between Ireland and the United Kingdom. In any event, RTE 
states, the Commission must prove that there is an appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States (judgment in Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 
207), and that is something which the Court of First Instance failed to take into 
account. It points out that the Commission' s arguments on this aspect relate only to 
sales in Great Britain, to ITP and to the BBC. 
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67 It is to be noted at the outset that the Court of Justice has consistently held that, 
pursuant to Article 168a of the Treaty and Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the EEC, an appeal may rely only on grounds relating to infringement of 
rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts (judgment in Case C-53/92 
P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-667, paragraph 10). The arguments relied on by 
RTE must therefore be rejected in so far as they question the appraisal of the facts by 
the Court of First Instance. 
 
68 Nevertheless, the condition that trade between Member States must be affected is a 
question of law and, as such, subject to review by the Court of Justice. 
 
69 In order to satisfy the condition that trade between Member States must be 
affected, it is not necessary that the conduct in question should in fact have 
substantially affected that trade. It is sufficient to establish that the conduct is capable 
of having such an effect (judgments in Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission, cited 
above, paragraph 104, and in Case C-41/90 Hoefner and Elser v Macrotron [1991] 
ECR I-1979, paragraph 32). 
 
70 In this case, the Court of First Instance found that the applicant had excluded all 
potential competitors on the geographical market consisting of one Member State 
(Ireland) and part of another Member State (Northern Ireland) and had thus modified 
the structure of competition on that market, thereby affecting potential commercial 
exchanges between Ireland and the United Kingdom. From this the Court of First 
Instance drew the proper conclusion that the condition that trade between Member 
States must be affected had been satisfied. 
 
71 It follows that the plea in law alleging misapplication by the Court of First Instance 
of the concept of trade between Member States being affected must be dismissed. 
 
The Berne Convention (third plea in the appeal in Case C-241/91 P) 
 
72 So far as the Berne Convention ("the Convention") is concerned, RTE had 
submitted before the Court of First Instance that Article 9(1) thereof conferred an 
exclusive right of reproduction and that Article 9(2) allowed a signatory State to 
permit reproduction only in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction did 
not conflict with normal exploitation of the work and did not unreasonably prejudice 
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the legitimate interests of the author. From this RTE deduced that Article 2 of the 
contested decision was incompatible with the Convention inasmuch as it conflicted 
with the normal exploitation of RTE' s copyright in the programme listings and 
seriously prejudiced its legitimate interests (RTE judgment, paragraph 100). 
 
73 In response to those arguments, the Court of First Instance considered whether the 
Convention was applicable. Its first finding was that the Community was not a party 
to it. After reviewing Article 234 of the EEC Treaty and the case-law of the Court of 
Justice (RTE judgment, paragraph 102), the Court of First Instance pointed out that 
"In the present case concerning Ireland and the United Kingdom, ... under Article 5 of 
the Act of Accession, Article 234 of the EEC Treaty applies to agreements or 
conventions concluded before ... 1 January 1973." From this it deduced that "In intra-
Community relations, therefore, the provisions of the Berne Convention, ratified by 
Ireland and the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973, cannot affect the provisions 
of the Treaty. ... The argument that Article 2 of the decision is in conflict with Article 
9(1) of the Berne Convention must therefore be dismissed, without there even being 
any need to inquire into its substance." With regard to Article 9(2) of the Convention, 
the Court of First Instance observed that this provision "was introduced by the Paris 
revision of 1971, to which the United Kingdom has been a party since 2 January 1990 
and which Ireland has not yet ratified." The Court of First Instance then pointed out 
that an agreement or a convention concluded subsequent to accession without 
recourse to the procedure set out in Article 236 of the EEC Treaty cannot affect a 
provision of the Treaty (RTE judgment, paragraph 103). 
 
74 The Court of First Instance accordingly dismissed as unfounded the plea alleging 
infringement of the Convention (RTE judgment, paragraph 104). 
 
75 RTE claims that Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, as revised in Paris in 1971, 
only allows for exceptions from authors' exclusive rights of reproduction to be made 
by legislation, in special cases, and provided that such reproduction does not prejudice 
the normal exploitation of the work or cause unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate 
interests of the author. 
 
76 According to RTE, the Convention does not contain a definition of what comes 
under its protection but excludes only "miscellaneous news facts having the character 
of mere facts of press information" (Article 2(8)), an exception which must be 
interpreted restrictively. It is thus for the national legislature and courts to determine 
the scope of the Convention at national level. 
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77 RTE submits that the obligation imposed by the Commission' s decision has not 
been provided for by legislation which is sufficiently clear in its terms to define the 
circumstances in which, and the conditions on which, reproduction is to be permitted. 
The decision itself cannot be regarded as "legislation". Application of competition law 
does not fulfil the conditions of Article 9(2). A copyright holder must be able to know 
on the basis of explicit legislation whether or not he may be subject to an obligation of 
compulsory licensing. A provision such as Article 86 of the Treaty, which merely sets 
out a general obligation and must be made precise and adapted from case to case, does 
not fulfil the conditions laid down by Article 9(2) of the Convention. Community 
legislation alone is capable of providing a proper legislative basis. 
 
78 RTE submits that the Convention is part of the rules of law relating to the 
application of the Treaty referred to in Article 173 of the EEC Treaty. In support of 
that proposition, RTE refers to numerous declarations made by the Commission 
which show that the Convention enjoys broad international support (see the preamble 
to the Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the accession of the Member States 
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised 
by the Paris Act of 24 July 1971, and the International Convention for the Protection 
of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome 
Convention) of 26 October 1961, OJ 1991 C 24, p. 5). According to RTE, the 
Commission has always regarded the Convention as establishing a minimum level of 
protection. It refers to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of 
computer programs (OJ 1989 C 91, p. 4, particularly pp. 8 and 10) and Council 
Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs 
(OJ 1991 L 122, p. 42). The amended Commission proposal for a Council Decision 
concerning the accession of the Member States to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised by the Paris Act of 24 July 1971, 
and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention) of 26 October 1961 
(OJ 1992 C 57, p. 13) states (Article 1a): 
 
"In the exercise of its powers concerning copyright and neighbouring rights, the 
Community shall be guided by the principles and act in accordance with the 
provisions of the Berne Convention ...". 
 
The Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of databases, adopted on 
29 January 1992, provides a legislative basis for compulsory licensing. RTE observes 
that, in all fields other than competition law, the Community respects the Convention. 
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79 RTE accordingly takes the view that, although the Community itself is not a party 
to the Convention, account must be taken of the rules of that Convention within the 
framework of Community law (judgments in Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] 
ECR 491, and in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 
2859). 
 
80 According to RTE, the Community cannot, on the one hand, oblige the Member 
States to accede to and comply with the Convention and, on the other, adopt measures 
which do not comply with it. 
 
81 In conclusion, it contends that examination of the scope of Articles 234 and 236 
would be relevant only if a conflict between the obligations arising from the 
Convention and certain provisions of the EEC Treaty had been established. 
 
82 IPO endorses this opinion and contends that harmonization of national intellectual 
property law can be achieved only by legislative means, namely by a Council measure 
adopted in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 100a or Article 235 
of the EEC Treaty. An individual decision issued by the Commission on the basis of 
competition law is not the appropriate way to resolve this issue. 
 
83 It is appropriate to observe at the outset, as the Court of First Instance did, that the 
Community is not a party to the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works. 
 
84 Next, so far as the United Kingdom and Ireland are concerned, it is true that they 
were already parties to the Convention when they acceded to the Community and that 
Article 234 of the Treaty therefore applies to that Convention, in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Act of Accession. It is, however, settled case-law that the provisions 
of an agreement concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty or prior to a Member 
State' s accession cannot be relied on in intra-Community relations if, as in the present 
case, the rights of non-member countries are not involved (see, in particular, the 
judgment in Case 286/86 Ministère Public v Deserbais [1988] ECR 4907, paragraph 
18). 
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85 Finally, the Paris Act, which amended Article 9(1) and (2) of the Convention (the 
provisions relied on by RTE), was ratified by the United Kingdom only after its 
accession to the Community and has still not been ratified by Ireland. 
 
86 The Court of First Instance was therefore correct to hold that Article 9 of the 
Convention cannot be relied on to limit the powers of the Community, as provided for 
in the EEC Treaty, since the Treaty can be amended only in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 236. 
 
87 It follows that the plea that the Court of First Instance failed to have proper regard 
to the Convention must be dismissed as unfounded. 
 
The powers conferred on the Commission by Article 3 of Regulation No 17 (second 
plea in the appeal in Case C-242/91 P) 
 
88 The first limb of ITP' s second plea is that the Court of First Instance misconstrued 
Article 3 of Regulation No 17 in holding that that provision enabled the Commission 
to impose compulsory licensing, on conditions approved by it, relating to intellectual 
property rights conferred by the laws of the Member States. Relying on the judgment 
in Case 144/81 Keurkoop v Nancy Kean Gifts [1982] ECR 2853, ITP submits that 
only the Parliaments of Ireland and the United Kingdom may take away or replace the 
copyrights which they have conferred. 
 
89 The second limb alleges infringement of the principle of proportionality in so far 
as the Court of First Instance held that the Commission' s decision was not contrary to 
that principle (ITP judgment, paragraphs 78 to 81). ITP contends that the Court of 
First Instance should have taken account of a number of considerations: the decision 
removed not only ITP' s exclusive right of reproduction, but also its right of first 
marketing, particularly important where, as in this case, the product has a useful life 
of 10 days; there is no reciprocity between ITP and the competitors (other than the 
BBC and RTE) to whom it is required to grant licences; many of those competitors, 
particularly the national newspapers, have turnovers and profits greatly in excess of 
those of ITP and they also possess valuable copyrights which they protect from 
reproduction. 
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90 It is appropriate to observe that Article 3 of Regulation No 17 is to be applied 
according to the nature of the infringement found and may include an order to do 
certain acts or things which, unlawfully, have not been done as well as an order to 
bring an end to certain acts, practices or situations which are contrary to the Treaty 
(judgment in Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents, cited above, 
paragraph 45). 
 
91 In the present case, after finding that the refusal to provide undertakings such as 
Magill with the basic information contained in television programme listings was an 
abuse of a dominant position, the Commission was entitled under Article 3, in order to 
ensure that its decision was effective, to require the appellants to provide that 
information. As the Court of First Instance rightly found, the imposition of that 
obligation ° with the possibility of making authorization of publication dependent on 
certain conditions, including payment of royalties ° was the only way of bringing the 
infringement to an end. 
 
92 The Court of First Instance was also entitled to dismiss, on the basis of the same 
findings of fact, the allegation that the principle of proportionality had been infringed. 
 
93 As the Court of First Instance correctly pointed out, in the context of the 
application of Article 3 of Regulation No 17, the principle of proportionality means 
that the burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an infringement of 
competition law to an end must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain 
the objective sought, namely re-establishment of compliance with the rules infringed 
(ITP judgment, paragraph 80). 
 
94 In holding, at paragraph 81 of the ITP judgment, that, in the light of the above 
findings, the order addressed to the applicant was an appropriate and necessary 
measure to bring the infringement to an end, the Court of First Instance did not 
commit an error of law. 
 
The reasoning (third plea in the appeal in Case C-242/91 P) 
 
95 In its third plea ITP claims that the Court of First Instance failed to comply with 
Article 190 of the EEC Treaty in finding that the decision was adequately reasoned 
(ITP judgment, paragraphs 64 and 65) when the Commission did no more than state 
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that the exercise of copyright was outside the scope of the specific subject-matter of 
this right and went on to conclude that an exercise of copyright consisting simply in 
refusing to grant a reproduction licence was an abuse of a dominant position. 
 
96 According to ITP, the crucial question whether a mere refusal to grant a licence 
could constitute an abuse was dealt with by the Commission in a summary fashion. 
There was no analysis of the special position occupied by owners of copyright in the 
context of the application of Article 86. ITP maintains that such an approach fails to 
meet the requirements laid down in the judgment in Case C-269/90 Hauptzollamt 
Muenchen-Mitte v Technische Universitaet Muenchen [1991] ECR I-5469. ITP 
maintains that it still does not know what the Commission meant by describing ITP' s 
use of its copyright as falling outside the scope of the specific subject-matter of the 
intellectual property right. 
 
97 ITP claims that the inadequacy of the decision' s reasoning was highlighted by the 
numerous arguments advanced by the Commission in the course of the proceedings 
before the Court of First Instance. If the Commission could so act and remain within 
the law, Article 190 would be rendered nugatory. ITP submits that the Court of First 
Instance adopted its own legal reasoning which bore no relation to the decision. 
 
98 The Court must observe here that, according to settled case-law, Commission 
decisions intended to find infringements of competition rules, issue directions and 
impose pecuniary sanctions must state the reasons on which they are based, in 
accordance with Article 190 of the EEC Treaty, which requires the Commission to set 
out the reasons which prompted it to adopt a decision, so that the Court can exercise 
its power of review and Member States and nationals concerned know the basis on 
which the Treaty has been applied (see the judgment in Case C-137/92 P Commission 
v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, paragraph 66). 
 
99 However, the Commission cannot be required to discuss all the matters of fact and 
law which may have been dealt with during the administrative proceedings (judgment 
in Case 246/86 Belasco and Others v Commission [1989] ECR 2117, paragraph 55). 
 
100 The Court of First Instance found in particular, at paragraph 64 of the ITP 
judgment, that "as regards the concept of abuse, the Commission clearly stated in the 
decision its reasons for finding that the applicant, by using its exclusive right to 
reproduce the listings as the instrument of a policy contrary to the objectives of 
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Article 86, went beyond what was necessary to ensure the protection of the actual 
substance of its copyright and committed an abuse within the meaning of Article 86." 
It accordingly arrived at the view that "Contrary to the applicant' s allegations, the 
statement of reasons in the contested decision is ... sufficient to allow interested 
parties to ascertain the main legal and factual criteria on which the Commission based 
its findings and to enable the Court to carry out its review. It therefore fulfils the 
conditions relating to the respect of the right to a fair hearing as they have consistently 
been defined in the case-law." 
 
101 ITP' s criticisms fail to show that those assessments of the Court of First Instance 
are marred by an error of law. 
 
102 It must be added that, in so far as those criticisms concern the inadequacy of the 
legal analysis of the situation made by the Commission in its decision, they 
substantially reproduce the arguments put forward to challenge the description of the 
appellants' conduct as an abuse of a dominant position, arguments which have already 
been rejected above in the examination of the first plea in law. 
 
103 The plea of non-compliance with Article 190 of the Treaty must therefore be 
dismissed. 
 
104 It follows that the appeals must be dismissed in their entirety. 
 
Decision on costs 
 
Costs 
 
105 According to Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to 
be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for by the successful party. Since 
the appellants have failed in their submissions, they must each be ordered to pay the 
costs of their appeal. Pursuant to Article 69(4) of the Rules of Procedure, IPO, which 
has intervened in support of the appellants, must be ordered to bear its own costs as 
well as those incurred by the Commission due to IPO' s intervention. 
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Operative part 
 
On those grounds, 
 
THE COURT 
 
hereby: 
 
1. Dismisses the appeals; 
 
2. Orders Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd 
(ITP) to pay the costs of the appeals lodged by them; 
 
3. Orders Intellectual Property Owners Inc. (IPO) to bear its own costs and to pay 
those incurred by the Commission due to its intervention. 
 
  
 
 
   
  
